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English Edition PE 54.493/fin.By letter of 31 March 1978 the Committee on Development and Cooperation
requested authorization to draw up a report on the form, status, context and
application of the Code of Conduct for Community companies with subsi9iaries,
branches or representation in South Africa.
By letter af 27 April 1978 the President of the European Parliament
authorized the committee to draw up a report on this subject. The political
Affairs Cornrni ttee, the Cornmi ttee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the
Committee on External Economic Relations were asked for their opinions.
On 18 May 1978 the Committee on Development and Cooperation appointed
Mr Lagorce rapporteur.
It considered the draft report at its meetings of 22 June 1978,
23 November 1978, 29 November 1978 and 28 February 1979. At the latter
meeting it unanimous ly adopted the motion for a resolution.
On 15 March 1979, a t the request of the rapporteur p this report was
referred back to the commi ttee.
At the meeting of 4 and 5 April 1979 the report was considered again
and the motion for a resolution adopted unanimously, with one abstention.
Present: Mr BERSANI  vice-chairman and acting chairman; Mr SANDRI 
vice-chairman, Mr LAGORCE, vice-chairman and rapporteur; Mr BERTRAND
(deputizing for Mr DESCHAMPS), Lord CASTLE, Mr FlORET, Mr FLAMIG, Mr GLINNE,
Mrs lOTTI, Mr LEZZI, Mr MARTINELLI, Mr NYBORG, Lord REA"Y, Lord St. OSWALD,
Mr VERGEER, Mr VERNASCHI and Mr WAWRZIK.
The Commi ttee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Commi ttee on
External Economic Relations have decided not to submi t an opinion on this
report.
The opinion of the Political Affairs Committee is attached.
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- 4 - PE 54 ~49J/finoThe Commi ttee on Development and Cooperation hereby submits to the
EuropcQn PQrliament the following motion for a resolution, together with
exp1 a na tory  ta temen 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on the form, status, context and application of the Code of Conduct for
Communi ty con.panies wi th subsidiaries, branches or representations in
South Africa
~he EuropeaD Parliament
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and Cooperation
and the opi~ion of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 70/79),
- deeply conGcrned at the pursuit of racial policies and denial of fundamental
civil and human rights by the South African Government,
- having regard to the dangerous and unstable situation created by these
policies in southern Africa and the threat it represents to world peace,
1.  Strongly condemnsl on poli tical, humani tarian and moral grounds, the
apartheid policy of the Republic of South Africa, a unique form of the
violation of human rights since it is expressly written into the con-
stituti on of that country and the fate of the individual is determined
by the cJlour of his skin alone, both at present and in the future;
2.. Welcomes  the fact tha t both the Communi ty and i ~s Member Sta tes have
repea tRdly and unequivocally condemned South Africa s racial policy (H1d
have joined with illl civilized countries in rej ecting the establishment
of homelands, since the Bantustan system serves only to consolidate the
apartheid policy, but notes that the severe conderonations delivered by
the various- international authori ties concerned have not always been
reflecterl in the conduct of relations wi th South Africa 
3 " Consider~ that, although the Code of Conduct adopted on 20 September 1977
within ~he framework of political cooperation is not legally binding and
depends on voluntary implementation, it represents a credibility test
for the poli tical will of the Nine and must be a decisive factor in the
establishment of an overall strategy to combat apartheid, starting with
the vi tal sector of employment;
- 5 - PE 54.. 4 93/fin..4 " Regrets, however" that certain passages of the Code of Conduct are
imprecise and superficial and have been drafted in a psychological~y
un fort una tc style; in particular, this anti-apartheid document 
i tsel f inccl11pl ete inasmuch as it refers only to black llfrican workers
and tal: s t.otal1y to acknov;ledge that South African society also
includ:~c Asians and coloureds, whc are like' wise affecte~ b'l the
par t.hej d policy;
5 G Therefore urges those responsible to correct as soon as possible the
inadequa cies referred to in Section III (2) of the attached explana tory
statement (Content of the Code of Conduct) and to exp~nd or amend the
text of the Cede accordingly, in particular Articles l(c) and (e), 2 (b),
3 , 9 4 ( b ) and 5 (b) 
6 " Consider s that several provisions of tile present CodA of Conduct should
be imprcved, pa:cticularly as regards the fixing of minimum wages and the
systema tic surveillance of the application of the Code; also feel 
thi 5 c0nnection, tha t the governments of the Nine must jointly exert
pressure, possibly including the imposition of legal and financial
sanctions on EEC undertakings whose subsidiaries, branches or represen-
tations refuse to cooperate in the implementation of the Code s provisions;
7 . Deplores the fact that the Code was not drafted in close cooperation wi 
the employer s I and "",arkers t organiza tions t'espons ibl e for its impl ernen-
tation an~ applicationg and further regrets that these organizations were
not infe ~med of the obj ectives of this policy until a relatively late
stage~'
8.. Calls on the Foreign .Ministers of the t1ine meeting in political
cooperation to examine, as soon as possible, ways of improving the Code
of Conduct, and to collaborate closely on this task, and on the future
ppl ica tieD of the Code,  ~tli  th the Commi ssionr the Economic and Social
Committee a:1d representatives of both sides of industrYi
C~118t moreover, on the Council to illitiate an information and publicity
r'ampaigr tCi explain the content and obj ectives of the Code of Conduct to
the citiL'3DS of the European Community; further considers i t esscnti~ 1
for the governments of the ltlember Sta tes to provide the mass media wi th
precise information on the application and effects of thc- Code of Conduct;
10.. Considers it illogical that the Code should have been adopted by 
Communi ty decision, while the responsibili ty for ensuring its observance
and application rests with the Member States; therefore calls on the
nine governments of the Member States to agree 38 soon as possible on a
common fOl"mula for the application of the Code, in order to elimina 
from th~ outset any disadvantages or distortions of competition that
could 2' ffect individual campanles;
- 6 - PE 54.493/fin..11. ThereforE calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political
coopera :ion, the Council or the Commission to inform Parliament
immedia t~ly of the measures envisaged or already ini tia ted by the
gover nments to ensure the uniform application of the Code throughout
the Community;
l2o Requests Members of the European Parliament to keep in close touch in
their national parliaments, with the measures taken by their respective
national governments to implement the Code of Conduct and, where
necessary, to initiate appropriate action themselves;
13. Regrets that when adopting the Code of Conduct~ the EEC Foreign Ministers
did not u t the same time agree on a model for the drawing up of compa ~y
reports, ~ vital precondition for the uniform application of the Codei
calls on the Foreign Ministers, therefore, to make good this omission
wi thout. delay:
14. Stresses the importance of Article 7 of the Code of Conduct as a means
of exercising control and calls on the Conference of Foreign Ministers
specifically
- to r ~port annually to Pan iament on the application of the Code of
Condu~t by Communi ty companies which have their legal or actual
head~uarters in the Communi ty and maintain subsidiaries in South
Africa and
- to subrni t the reports drawn up by these Communi ty companies to
ParI iawent:
15 . Recalls in this connection the assurances given in the pest by various
Presidents-in-Office of the Council both to Par~_iament and to the Joint
Cornmi ttce of the ACP-EEC Convention that they would keep Parliament
informe~ on observance of the Codej
16.. Takes ~he view that the systematic evaluation of these reports should be
organized centrally, and hopes that this task will be delegated to the
Commission of the European Communitiesj also feels that an ad hoc
working party of the Committee on Development and Cooperation should be
set up to scrutinize the reports of the companies concerned;
17  Calls for.. t.he whole question of the Code of Conduct to be transferred
from thl: Foreign Ministers meeting in poli tical coQperation to the
since it will be possible to establish a clear policy and ensure
Code is fairly applied and respected by Communi ty companies only
Council.
tha t th(
if there is coordination between the Commission, the Council and Parliament;
- 7 - PE 54..493/fin...10. Considers th~ t, ~lt the present time, a gcncr~l economic boycott by the
1'~l~:C ilgdinst South Africl1 would not be. reC11istic and would probably be
coun tc rproduc ti vc  strongly hopes, nevertheles 5, tha t the Communi 
will co.Asider and propose, first of all in the UN, a programme of
specific political measures and actions which should be progressively
adopted by the entire international ommuni ty in order to induce the
South African Government to end,  de facto and  de ture, all forms of
racial discrimination;
19. Call$, howe7er, for a systematic examination of measures that might be
deployed at Community level to compel Community companies to observe
the ruks' of the Code of Conduct; if the application of the Code in its
present form proves ineffective, consideration should also be given
to how J'he Communi ty could use its economic power to force Sout h Africa
to chal1ge its  partheid pol icy;
20.. Believes that the adoption of the Code of Conduct must be followed by
action in other areas and that, in particular 2xisting cuI tural agree-
ments 'betw~en Community countries and South Africa should be denounced,
since therl~ is a contradiction between the concept of cuI ture and tha 
of apartheid;
21. ConsiGe~s it very important for the principles proclaimed in the Code
of Cond'1ct to be applied also by the industrialized nations outsi;de the
Europedn Communi ty, and therefore welcomes the fact tha t the Communi 
has alr~ady taken steps to this end within the OECD;
22. Supports -the measures to eliminate apartheid policy urged by the
various inDtitutions of the Lom~ Convention, ill particular the Joint
Committe~, and in this connection welcomes the exceptional financial
aid which the Community grants to ACP States particularly hard hit by
South Africa I s racial policy and which it intends to be seen as a clear
politic 11 gesture~
23. Hopes that, in the spiri t of partnership of the Lome Convention, practic~l
express~on will be given on the European side to the j oint declaration~
nnd resolutions adopted with the Community s ACP partners at the last
meetings of the Consul tative Assembly and the Joint Committee;
24,. Hopes that wi th the renegotiation of the ACP-EEC Convention, exceptional
aid to these countries will be increased ~ubstantially, ei ther by
extendin~ the possibili ties for which Article 59 of the Lome Convention
already provides or by creating an addi tional special action progralnme;
25  Repea~s its view that observance of the embargo on arms supplies, control
of the Jse of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, an end to the
financing of South African industry by European banks and refusal to grant
credit guarantees and export licences represen-t effective means of
combating apartheid;
- 8 - PE 54..493/fin$26. Colls l)n the Community to develop IlL lon9 last n con~.:i-rucLj\i(~ and
coht:,rent lJolicy on Africa which would treat the problem of South Africa
as a special case, since a worsening of the situation in that". part of
the wol.ld would have serious consequences, not only for the African
continent itself, but also for all of Europe s poli tical, economic and
stratec ic relations with Africa and the rest of the world7
...
27.. Welcomes the Community s unequivocal condemnation of the apartheid ~ystem,
but feels bound to point out that this 3lone cannot form the. basis of a
policy on Africa; indeed, it is essential that. by adopting the Code of
Conduct, the Community should not purely and simply pass on its respon-
sibility for the abolition of apartheid a~d thus ad~it to an inability to
find an overall solution to this delicate protlem by its own efforts:
28. Therefcre urges the Community to pursue a ' Realpolitik' by evolving" in
parallel with its condemnations of apartheid, a strategy which establishes
and guarantees the right of existence of all ethnic groups, this being an
indispe~sable condition for a peaceful solution to racial conflict;
29. Is convi:1ced that the EEC is not equipped, in instit.utional terms, to
make an effective contribution to the solution of serious crises, in
Africa or elsew1;lere in the world; consequently  calls upon all those
responsible in the Community to take cognizance of Europe s responsibility
for sa fe~uarding world peace and to establish a vigorous and dynamic
policy ~ich could help to achieve a balance of world power which would
not be D3sed exclusively on relations between the superpowers, and to
promote the right of Third World countries to choose the way in which
they should develop, exercise their sovereignty and cooperate at inter-
national level, free of any prior obligation to ally with any one bloc:
30.. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and
Commission of the European Communities, and to the Foreign Ministers
of the nine Member States of the European Community meeting in political
cooper a tion..
- 9 - PE 54 .493/fin.Introduction:
EXPIANATORY STATEMENT
South Africa has developed into a potential f1ashpoint
of world politics
l. Since the granting of independence to the Portuguese overseas
provinces of Angola and Mozambique, southern Africa has been in the
centre of the political stage. The effects of deco1onization in this
region cannot yet be judged. Southern Africa is one of today I s major
international trouble spots not only on account of the difficulties in
Rhodesia and Namibia and the policy of apartheid in the Republic of South
Africa but also because there is a dangerous overlap here between the
problems of the north-south relationship and political antagonisms
between east and west.
2. As South Africa develo~ into one of the most sensitive points in
world politics, discussion of the region t s political future is therefore
becoming increasingly topical. Liberation movements are fighting against
the last vestiges of colonialism and racism in Africa and rightly demanding
the support of Europe for their cause. The Soviet Union and some other
communist states are encouraging the liberation movements with massive
military aid, aid which the EEC and other western states have to refuse
on humanitarian grounds.
Whilst the governments of black Africa demand transition to a South
African unitary state under black majority rule, the whites in South Africa
believe they have f()und a practicable alternative in their policy of apar-
theid which will allow at least a white  r~p I state to survive in South
Africa. In the cabe of Namibia and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), it now seems
that, despite the many imponderables, a solution in the form of a black
majority government has been brought nearerj no solution is in view for
the Republic of South Africa, although there is  no  shortage of proposals.
There is only agreement on the condemnation and rejection of the existing
racialist system and the need to destroy this system as soon as possible.
Only a few years ago, neither the world powers nor the EEC showed any
political interest in South Africa and even warning voices like that of
President Kaunda of Zambia were not taken seriously. Today the possibi-
lity of conflict in and around South Africa has become so acute, particu-
larly because of the presence of contingents of foreign troop~ that an
armed struggle in this region could degenerate into a worldwide catastrophe.
The situation is all the more dangerous since the white Africans show no
signs of a willingness to compromise and indeed appear prepared to take
up armed struggle and risk self-destruction.
10 - PE 54. 493 /fin I . Some reflections on the policy of apartheid and the internal development
of the Republic of South Africa
4. The internal political and economic organization of the Republic
of South Africa is with reason severely criticized. criticism is
particularly warranted because the policy of apartheid or  separate
development' has been imposed by the white majority on the blacks and
those of mixed race and Indian origin.  Separate development' is
particularly objectionable because it favours the. white population alone
and inflicts only humiliation and degradation on the other groups. The
rigid views of the white South Africans have led them into a labyrinth,
with a system of government which can only be described as 'white
oligarchy
' .
Internal unrest - one only has to think of Soweto  although at
present restricted to certain areas, is gradually beginning to open the
eyes of even the whites to the weaknesses of their system. In the field
of foreign affairs the South African government' s fierce attachment to
apartheid is not only leading to general isolation and ostracism in the
world and international organizations but may in future also give rise
to considerable international complications and confusion. This un-
compromising attitude on apartheid has led to a situation where the
racism of the whites provokes the nationalism of the blacks. Today the
blacks are convinced that only the enemies of their enemies, particularly
the communists states, are their friends. In view of recent events in
black Africa, no one can really dispute this view.
The racial policy of the South African government is incompatible
with the standards of civilized behaviour. The~e is no question that
5outh Africa is continually violating the human rights of its black
population, their freedoms and privileges. Under the existing system
of government only the whites, as citizens of the country, can own land,
businesses and factories. The civil service, judiciary, government and
even the parliament are white. The standard of living of the four
million whites is as high as in comparable industrialised countries, but
only because the twenty million black and co10ured people work for them.
Millions of black people keep industry, mining, transport etc. in
operation and produce very large profits for the whites in return for
very low wages. The black majority has no civil rights of any type,
cannot vote and is not eligible for election.
6. One of the greatest faults of the South ~fricans is to permit a
situation where 45% of the blacks are still illiterate. Only a very
small number receive higher school education. The blacks have bad,
-11 - PE 54. 493/ fin-overcrowded schools, which cannot accommodate all the children and
the teaching is of a' lower quality than that given to the whites.
tactic is clear: the blacks are only to be educated for subordinate
tasks. They are deliberately prevented from obtaining an education
which would enable them to take an effective role in business, adminis-
tration or government. There are only three black universities for
a few hundred students, and then only those who do not criticize the
The
system.
7. Very few members of the black population have so far been able to
make their way into the highly qualified professions. The professions
of technician, doctor or mining engineer are examples, and indeed the
second of these is a blatant example of crude political neglect. Dis-
crimination exists not only in schools and universities but particularly
in the training of skilled workers which is the preserve of the white
trade unions. In addition to the regulations ~1icb reserve skilled
work for whites in order to exclude blacks from positions of superiority
over m1ites, there is the extremely unjust discrimination in pay even
though the black labour force is absolute ly necessary to the functioning
of the South African industrial economy.
8. Every black must carry his pass with him at all times and in all
places. If the papers are not in order, the pErson in question 
immediately taken to prison. Those with work are allowed to live in a
black settlement, those that are unemployed are not. This law sometimes
has appalling consequences particularly since black unemployment is very
high and rising rapidly because of the increasing mechanization and
automation of the economy.
9. Since black workers are urgently needed in the industrial centres
but are unwelcome as people and as citizens, they and their families
have to find a place to live in the so-called ' ~omelands I , far from
civilization. These constitute 13% of the surface area and take the
form of enclaves scattered over the whole country, most of which do not
have any geographical unity. This dispersal has no economic or politi-
cal justification. Moreover it is an absurd idea to settle 80% of the
total population on 13% of the surface of the south African subcont  nent
particularly since there is no work at all available in most of the
homelands. The homelands ' share of the  gross domestic product of South
Africa is approximately 2~%. Only the northern Bantu areas have any
raw materials. Because of their weak economic position, the state
budgets of the semi- independent homelands have to draw on subsidies from
the government in Pretoria, which in some cases cover as much as three-
quarters of a homeland's expenditure. Although the official line in
Pretoria is that the blacks in the homelands are free and can determine
for themselves under what conditions they wish to live  the fact of the
- 12 ~ PE 54. 49Vfin matter is that the freedom of decision of the homeland governments 
extremely limited by their financial and economic dependence.
10. Under the homelands scheme, the Bantus are allocated autonomous
territories. They obtain a separate nationality on a tribal basis, but
at the same time lose South African nationality. The real meaning of
this is that if, in future, there should be free elections in South Africa,
the Bantus would not have the right to vote in them. Thus the sole aim
of the home land policy is to safeguard the power and living standards of
the white minority.
So far the Transkei and Bophuthatswana have achieved independence
and many other Bantu areas are making preparations for it. Some are
making prior territorial demands, while others are rejecting independence
because of the problems of the urban Bantu since the homelands scheme
reduces their status in the Republic of South Africa to that of foreign
workers and in return for no more than notional citizenship. The
essential problem of territorial apartheid is the fact that the blacks
settled in the homelands are aliens in the Republic of South Africa.
Although it cannot be denied that the political leaders of some of
the homelands have an independent role in the interplay of forces within
South African nationalism, the homeland idea has really failed to provide
a solution to the apartheid problem.
11. Anyone, whether black or white, who opposes the 'Official racial policy
of the government, and anyone who, for christian or humanitarian reasons,
takes action to improve the rights of the blacks must expect imprisonment.
While it is true that human rights are violated in many other countries
of the world, what makes the South African system so objectionable 
that it makes the colour of a person I s skin the sole arbiter of his or her
fate. To be black means quite simply to be a member of an inferior race,
to be deprived of civil and human rights and to run the danger of being
punished for attempting to obtain basic rights. This cruel inhuman
system exists in a state which describes itself as demo-
cratic, whose inhabitants imagine themselves to be the elect and make
constant reference to the economic prosperity which this state has achieved.
12. Unfortunately there is as yet no sign of a change of view in government
circles. The majority of South Africans are stubborn and determined and
convinced of the justice of the official policy of apartheid. The former
American Secretary of State, Dr Kissinger, clearly rea1ised this when,
following talks with the South African Prime Minister in 1976, he said
that to him Vorster was like a figure from the Old Testament. It is true
that in recent years there has been a gradual abolition of ' petty apartheid 
removing some of the offensive measures but this has not indicated any
- 13 - PE 54. 493/ fin.readiness for a genuine change of heart. On the contrary 1 the removal
of some niggling humiliations has more of a cosmetic effect and does
nothing to alter the basic dominance structures. Certainly there is not
the slightest suggestion of a readiness for change in the ruling National
Party which won an absolute majority at the last general election in 1977.
The situation is slightly different in the white opposition parties 
the United Party, the Progressive Party and the Democratic Party - which
are currently planning to amalgamate into a single party in order to
exert greater influence. Their common programme will most probably
include the abolition of racist white supremacy and the participation of
all citizens in the political life of South Africa. Hope may be found
in particular in the programme of the Progressive Party, the country I
liberal party, which' obtained 17 seats in the 165-seat parliament at the
last elections. Its programme calls for a limited and controlled access
of coloureds to all areas of society including political power. They
would be a sort of qualifications test to act as a regulator which would
at least give a black university professor the right to vote. Although
this is still not a final solution to the pr~blem, it does offer a ray of
hope. The only drawback is that the time for such a scheme appears to
be long since past. Even parties like the Progressive Party can no longer
turn the clock back, since today the coloureds are demanding full equal
rights with no exceptions.
l3. It has therefore to be made clear to the leaders of the South African
state that the age of colonialism and racism in Afri~a has finally passed.
The wheel of time cannot be stopped or turned back even on the African
continent. The inhuman system in South Africa has to be abolished, but
how? In what way is it possible to bring about peaceful change and a new
way of thinking in the South African Republic? It is very difficult to
predict from outside what will and what ought to happen. The best course
would naturally be for all the inhabitants of South Africa to work together
to find an internal solution without foreign interference. Outsiders
should in any case avoid doing anything which could make a solution more
difficult or could stabilize the present situation. The EEC, the united
States and other western countries must do their utmost to persuade the
South African whites to give up their apartheid policy and make them
realize once and for all that the supremacy of one race over another is no
longer acceptable in this day and age. No society subscribing to demo-
cratic, christian and humanitarian ideals can overlook this division of
mankind into first and second class human beings. Those conscious of
their responsibility, that is to say the democratic states of this world 
should therefore orientate their foreign and trade policies towards helping
to disentangle and change the political situation within the South African
Republic. The only difficulty is finding the appropriate means to achieve
this obi ccti ve.
PE 54o 493/fin.II. The European Communities ' position  on apartheid
14.. As the Republic of South Africa I s leading trading partner, the
European' Economic Community has a key role to play in the fight against
apartheid.. Both the Community as a whole and the individual member
countries have often stated their views on it. The Community s position
is that the South African government must take measures to produce funda-
mental changes so that a society can be created in which all South
Africans, irrespective of their race and the colour of their skin, can
live and work together in peace, equality and mutual respect. within
the framework of political cooperation, the foreign ministers have begun
to draw up and implement joint measures to influence the apartheid policy
in South Africa.
15. The declaration by the foreign ministers of the nine Member States
of 23 February 1976 drawn up in the framework of political cooperation
was the Community s first precise statement on apartheid. Although 
unambiguous ly condemned the aparthe id policy of the Republic of South
Africa, it did not contain any real indication as to how to mitigate or
abolish the discriminatory racial policy. On 28 September 1976 the
President- in-Office of the Council, the Netherlands Foreign Minister,
Mr Van der Stoel, condemned South Africa s racial policy on behalf of the
Nine before a meeting of the UN General Assembly.. On 28 October 1976
the permanent representative of the Netherlands, Mr Kaufmann, refused on
behalf of the Nine to recognize the notional independence granted on 26
October 1976 by South Africa to the Transkei, the first of the homel~nds,
explaining that to recognize the Transkei as an independent state would
only consolidate the policy of apartheid. The nine Community countries
also re fused to recognize the ' independence ' of Bophuthatswana.. 
declaration by the foreign ministers published on 22 November 1977
described the creation of bantustans as an element of the apartheid
policy.
16. On 12 January 1977 the late British fore gn minister, Mr Crosland
announced to the European Parliament, in his capacity as president-in-
Office of the Council, that (to quote but one example)  the Nine are
united in their opposition to the policy of apartheid in South Africa
which is unacceptable on moral grounds and ultimately unworkable in
. ,
practlce 
See the text of the Declaration adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the
Member States which was published at the end of a political cooperation
meeting held in Luxembourg on 23 February 1976, Annex I.
Debates of the European Parliament, OJ No. 211 (Annex), January 1977
p. 
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the Nigerian capital, Lagos  the representatives of 102 governments and
18 non-governmental organizations took part.
At the Conference, Mr Simonet, the Belgian foreign minister
acting in his capacity as President-in-Office of the Council, condemned
South Africa t s apartheid policy in strong terms. Speaking on behalf of
the Nine, he rejected the concept of ' separate communities I and regretted
that the South African government continued to refuse to work towards a
non-racist society in which the whole population could enjoy equal rights.
The Nine, he said, were convinced that only a move in this direction could
solve the country s problems. The policy of apartheid was an insult to
human dignity and inconsistent with the principles of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. On this occasion, the Community s represen-
tative gave the first indication that the Community was examining economic
measures which would help to persuade South Africa to give up apartheid.
The Lagos declaration was prepared in July 1977 by the foreign
ministers of the Nine acting within the framework of political cooperation
(EPC) .
In September 1977 Mr Simonet once again explained the Nine I
attitude to the South African question before the UN General Assembly and
on 12 October 1977 he condemned, in the strongest terms 1 the events in
South Africa which had led to the death of Steve Biko. Mr Biko, the
leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, an oppcnent of the bantustans
and an advocate of a peaceful solution in South Africa died under mysteri-
ous circumstances whilst under interrogation by the South African authori- ties. Publication of the investigation into the circumstances of the
death of this extremely popular black South African leader yielded facts
which shocked the whole civilized world. ' The Times I of 3 December 1977
stated that even sadder than his death was the fact that  the vast majority
of white South Africans approved - in the name of national security - of
what was done to Steve Biko, or cannot see what all the fuss has been about I
III.  Analysis of the Code of Conduct adopted by the Community for companies
with subsidiaries, branches or ~resentation in South Africa
1.. Decision by the Community to adopt a Code of Conduct for comQanies in
South Africa
18. At the meeting of Community foreign ministers of 12 July 1977 in
the framework of political cooperation, a working party of experts was
instructed to draw up a Code of Conduct for the activities of the Community
companies operating in South Africa. The central topic of the Code was to
be the working conditions of black workers in European companies in South
Africa. At the same time the experts were to prepare a technical report
- 16 PE 54.493/fin.on investment and export credit guarantees.
19. At their political cooperation meeting in Brussels on 20 September
1977 the foreign ministers of the nine Member States adopted the Code
of Conduct  for  Community companies with subsidiaries, branches or represen-
tation in South Africa. Incidentally, after this decision had been
taken, the meeting of the foreign ministers went on to become the 469th
meeting of the Council, something which would have been inconceivable a
few years ago..
20.. It is arguable whether the word  code I is appropriate since a code
is generally a legal document.. The word code means a set of rules or
collection of statutes.. However, the Code adopted by the Community is
not binding in law. The effectiveness of the text therefore essentially
depends on the willingness of the companies to comply with its provisions.
Some Community countries wanted a ban on incentives to invest in South
Africa, and restrictive provisions on export credi~ guarantees to be
included in the Code of Conduct, but the Nine failed to agree on certain
legal and material problems.. The Code does not cover the whole range
of economic relations between the Nine and South Africa; its exclusive
aim is to nullify South African apartheid legislation in the labour sector..
The emphasis of the Code is clearly on the demanc for equal treatment of
blacks and whites at the workplace.. The Code is divided into seven
chapters:
relations within the undertaking 
migrant labour,
pay,
wage st:Ct/.cture and black African advancement,
fringe benefits,
desegregation at places of work,
and finally, reports on the implementation of the Code of Conduct..
21.. The wording of some passages in the text is inexact or superficial 
This is hardly surprising since scarcely more than two months passed
between the request  for  the text to be drawn up (12 July 1977) and its
adoption by the nine foreign ministers (20 September 1977).. In view of
the immense significance of the apartheid problem, it is utterly incom-
prehensib1e why the formulation of such an important document was not
begun much earlier. The result would certainly have been much better if
the Commission had been involved in drawing up the text; but as the
Commission representative reported to the Committee on Development and
Cooperation on 29 March 1977, the Commission was at no time involved in
the discussions. In view of the delicate position of the Commission
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. It would also have been sensible if, before the decision was taken, the
competent bodies of the European Parliament and particularly the Committee
on Development and Cooperation could have been asked for its opinion or
at least consulted on the question particularly since a solution of the
apartheid que3tion has not only been an active concern of this Committee
but is also at the centre of discussions within the ACP-EEC Convention
of Lome..
22. The Community s policy on South Africa is in many areas incomplete
and impractical. Small steps are being taken but there is no overall
plan, a point which has still to be discussed in detail. It might
almost be thought that, by adopting the Code of Conduct, the Community
wanted to shift its respons bility for finding a solution to the South
African problem onto the business world, being incapable of devising an
overall solution for this delicate question itself. However, it would
be a mistake to write off the Code of Conduct completely. It is a
political gesture which can have an effect on morale. In the formulation
of a joint African policy for the Nine  the Code could be an important
step in the right direction, becoming an essential element of an overall
design.. Although the Code is not binding, some of its provisions do
conflict with the application of South African laws. This appears to
be the intention since this will make it possible to discover whether
the South African authorities are prepared to suffer economic losses in
order to preserve the purity of their apartheid philosophy, or, alter-
natively, to make concessions on apartheid in accordance with economic
reason..
23. T1"'cE' R. f-;':lblic of South Africa reacted relatively quickly to the Code
adopted by the Community, although only verbally. In a statement
issued in Pretoria on 26 September 1977 the South African Foreign
Minister Mr Botha 1 a moderate supporter of the apartheid policy, criti-
cized the ' high moral tone ' of the  Community governments. What he
actually said was: I The governments of the European Community have no
monopoly on morals
.. 
He said it was imperative for them to turn their
attention to conditions in their own countries which in many cases were
far from exemplary.. The Code would only be credible if it were applied
to the activities of European firms in all countries. Mr Botha said
that South Africa would supply the European Community with a review of
social conditions in other countries with which the Community traded..
It is true that there are social differences in all countries 1 including
those of the Community. There are also countries where social conditions
are catastrophic.. That is not the issue here ft The point here is that
the standard of living of the vast majority of the population in South
- 18  PE 54  493 / finAfrica is so low simply because the colour of their skin is black.
2.. Content of the Code of Conduct
24. The Code of Conduct adopted by the Community is not the first
document of this type. In 1974 the British Government adopted a White
Paper which British firms in South Africa were asked to observe. 
1977 a Charter on the same subject was drawn up by eleven multinational
American companies. Comparing these documents, the Community s Code
is more complete than the British code of practice and its requirements
go far beyond those set out in the American charter
25. Chapter 1 of the Code deals with relations within an undertaking.
Paragraph (c) of this chapter states: ' Should black African employees
decide that their representative body should be in the form of a trade
union, the company should accept this decision It is regrettable
that  should' is used instead of ' must '
.. 
Apart from this 1 this wording
does present a substantial step in the right direction and might have a
positive effect on the attitude of the South African government towards
the trade union question. The Code emphasises that trade unions for
black Africans are not illegal and that companies are free to recognize
them, negotiate and conclude agreements with them. That  is  very impor-
tant since there is discrimination in the field of training in skilled
trades which remains the preserve of the white trade union members.
The formation of non-white trade union organizations and fair negotiations
with employers I representatives, particularly European ones, are extremely
important in order to improve wages and working conditions, as black
workers are commonly exploited in South Africa because they are black and
therefore, as Steve Biko once said, exploitation based on race must be
abolished first.. Unfortunately the good start to chapter 1 of the Code
is let down slightly by paragraph (f) which states: ' Where works or
liaison co~mittees already operate, trade union officials should have
representative status on these bodies if employees so wish '
.. 
It would
have been better to omit this phrase as African workers have in the
past rejected these ' works and liaison committees I as being both unrepresen-
tative and ineffective.
26. Chapter 2 of the code deals with the problems of migrant workers.
It rightly describes the system of migrant labour in South Africa as an
instrument of the policy of apartheido The text continues:  Employers
have the social responsibility to contribute towards ensuring freedom of
movement for black African workers and their families These points
are important because current legislation prevents non-white employees
from seeking a job of their choice.. In addition, the system of migrant
labour leads to serious social and family conflicts. In addition to
see full text in Annex 
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stans and many migrant. workers from the independent African states which
border on the Republic of South Africa. Approximately 300, 000 black
migrant workers not of South African nationality enter South Africa
dailyo According to the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Dr Jonathan, over
45% of the labour force of this country alone is employed in South
.LrlCa 
27.. Chapter 3 refers to the problem of pay. It rightly states that
Companies should assume a special responsibility as regards the pay
and conditions of employment of their black African employees t .. 
therefore calls upon them to formulate specific policies aimed at
improving their terms of employment. The main point in chapter 3 of
the Code is clearly the reference to a minimum wage.. It specifically
states t Pay based on the absolute minimum necessary for a family to survive
cannot be considered as being sufficient' .. And the text goes on: t The minimum
wage should initially exceed by at least 50% the minimum level required to
sa tisfy the basic needs of an employee and his family ' This does not seem
logical... t The absolute minimum necessary for a family to survive' !as clearly
been wrongly calculated, since the lowest wage corresponding to it ' cannot be
considered as being sufficient'
The solution to this would therefore be simply to fix the minimum at a
sufficiently high level to ensure that the ' basic needs of an employee and
his family I are really satisfied, together with the corresponding minimum wage.
28.. This is a very important point in the Code of Conduct since for
human and social reasons it is not acceptable that black workers should
earn a fifth of the white wage in almost all branches of industry and
a seventh in mining co The payment of a minimum wage which barely permits
people to survive is inhuman, unjustifiable and unso~ia1$ In addition
to this, there is the increasing danger represented by accelerated
mechanization and automation which is contrary to the interests of black
workers. In view of the present precarious situation in some areas of
the economy and in order to remain competitive on the world market,
companies operating in South Africa will certainly push forward with
automation. In the countryside unemployment amongst the non-white
population has already reached a high level.. There is thus a very real
socia-economic problem as spiralling labour costs cause labour-intensive
production methods to be scrapped and replaced by capital-intensive
methods" However this deve lopment has been recognizable for some years.
The introduction of labour-saving techniques is thus not an  endogenous
type of specific racial discrimination  but a consequence of the
liberalization of wage and employment structures..
Mlnutes o ' the  meeting of the Joint committee in Maseru, 28 November to
1 December 1977, CAjCP/31, Annex II, p.
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increases for black workers exceeded those for. white workers between
1971 and 197 5 ~ in fact, however, because of their higher income levels,
the absolute increases in the whites  wages are much higher than those
of non-white workers. It is an undisputed fact that the poverty of the
black population is still South Africa J s main problem. It is therefore
necessary to raise wages, but this ought to be done in stages  There
must be realism here and the final effect must not be against the
interests of the black workers themselves  If capital-intensive
production methods,  e.  automation, are increasingly employed, the
Code ought to contain the provision that the unfavollrable side-effects
of cost saving rationalization measures of this type must not be berne
solely by non-white workers. These are a few basic ideas which will
have to be taken into consideration when implementing the Code  Demands
and rules which are to be applied by European companies operating in
South Africa must be drawn up with an exact idea of their possible
effects, bearing in mind particularly whether they will be to the
advantage of that part of the population which should and must be
helped.
29. Chapter 4 lays down the principle of ' equal pay for equal work' 
This means that ' all jobs should be open to any worker who possesses
suitable qualifications, irrespective of racial or other distinction,
and that wages should be based on a qualitative job evaluation
Although the text does not expressively demand the elimination of restric-
ted occupati~~' and professional closed shops, i. eo that certain- occu-
pat~0~~~~ught no longer to be the preserve of the w11ites, the text of
the Code doe~ go in the right direction:  Employer~ should draw up an
appropriate range of training schemes of a suitable standard to provide
training for their black African employees, and should reduce their
dependence on immigrant white labour This phrase is very important
because discrimination is especially marked  in  training. Moreover 
foreign firms operating in South Africa have often pointed out that
they very frequently ask permission to set up training centres for black
South Africans  Matters of this sort are however left by the government
to private bargaining between employers and employees. However since
training, especially training for skilled work, is the monopoly of the
white trade unions  it is understandable why so far no noticeable progress
has been made in the skilled training of non-white workers. The problem
is less acute within the skilled workforce since several technical schools
and an institutionalized and subsidized on-the-job training system provide
at least rudimentary training in industrial skills for black Africans 
300 Chapter 5 emphasizes companies I social responsibility for the
living conditions of their employees and families. It therefore pro-
poses action and welfare payments over and above the ~uestion of wages.
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their employment  pension matters, ed~cational matters, insurance
against industrial accidents and unemployment and other social welfare
measures . Most of these are measures which in any modern social state a~e
taken care of within the framework of family, social and health policy.
Since the Republic of South Africa must be counted as being one of the
important industrialized countries  social improvements for workers of
all races ought to be a matter of course.
31. Chapter 6 is chiefly concerned with petty apartheid. It calls
upon employers to abolish any practice of segregation notably at the
workplace and in canteens  sport activities  education and training.
It also calls for equal working conditions for all the staff of a
company..
32. In conclusion, the Code of Conduct is chiefly concerned with equal
treatment for all workers at the workplace.. It provides for the freedom
of association of workers, the right to wage bargaining, unhindered
activity by organizations representing employees and rules on a minimum
wage.. It also clearly calls for equal pay for equal work. To this
extent the Code deals with some important issues which, if it were to
be applied, would be of considerable assistance in improving the material
and social position of non-white workers. Unfortunately, the authors
of the Code of Conduct have committed a serious psychological mistake
since in many places it is only black African employees or workers who
are mentioned. This wording runs through the whole text and particularly
chapters  (c) and (e) , 2 (b) , 3, 4 (b) and 5 (b). The authors of the
text ought to be made aware of the fact that South African society 
made up of four groups, namely whites (18%), coloureds (9%) , people of
Indian origin (3%) and blacks (70%). That is very important since none
of the four groups seems to want to give up its identity.. Since the
Code of Conduct does contain some extremely important and well-chosen
points and can give a decisive stimulus to a solution of the apartheid
problem, it is extremely regrettable that some of its formulations have
to be regarded as racist. It is simply incomprehensible that a code
drawn up in order to nullify and abolish racial discrlmination should
itself contain racist elements. It would therefore be appropriate
when the text of the Code of Conduct is reviewed in detail by the approp-
riate authorities for these inaccuracies and racist undertones to be
remove d 
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33. The Committee on Development and Cooperation welcomes the fact
that the nine Foreign Ministers of the Communi ty have adopted a code of
conduct for companies operating in South Africa. This is an important
ini tiative since it may mark Hn -initial starting point for a policy on
South Africa and, if correctly appl  ed, may help to solve the apartheid
problem in South Africa. The criticism is often made that the code 
at present only voluntary. This criticism is not fully justified since
it should not be overlooked that the very adoption of the code implies
a specific pattern of political behaviour. To this extent, the Foreign
Ministers ' decision should be regarded as a step forward.
34. It is regrettable, however, that so important a decision should
be taken on the basis of a rather superficial text, drawn up far too
quickly and adopted by the Foreign Ministers at a pace completely out
of keeping with their normal practice~ It is not that Parliament is opposed
to rapid decisions but rather that in this case a little more patience
would certainly have produced a better result. Particularly deplorable 
the fact tha t the text was not drawn up in close consultation or at least
discussed wi th the organizations responsible for the implementation and
application of the code. The Nine were right not to discuss the code of
conduct wi th the government of the Republic of South Africa, and this needs
no further comment. On the other hand, it would have been appropriate to
discuss the implementation and observance of the code in depth with
employers 1 and employees ' organiza tions in the community before its
adoption. Nor from a poli tical point of view would it have been
inappropriate to consult the ACP states directly affected by South
Africa s apartheid policy.
35. It is no secret that the initial reaction to the code of some
employers ' organizations in some of the Member States was unfavourable.
This could have been prevented if representatives of industry had not
only been informed in good time but had also had the aims of the policy
explained to them. Mr Simonet, then President-in-Office of the Council,
himself referred to this in a statement before Parli~ment on
15 November 1977: ' After an unfavourable initial reaction from employers
associations in one or two Communi ty countries, the efforts made by the
governments to impress on them the crucial importance of wha t is at
stake have resul ted in an assurance by all the associations that they
will apply the code of conduct as fully as posslb1e And Mr Simonet I
successor q the Danish Foreign Minister Mr K~ B. Andersen, said on
15 March 1978: I The nine governments unanimous ly agreed to recommend
Deba tea of the European Parliament, OJ No.  223,  November 1977  po 4 7 - 23 - PE 54,, 493 /fin..this code of conduct to parent companies and are at present discussing
its implementation with employers I and workers I organizations in the
Member States
' 1
Whether it is true 1 as Mr Simonet told Parliament, that
all associations have indicated their willingness to apply the code of
conduct as fully as possible, is another matter. Waat is important 
tha t the Communi ty has begun a campaign to explain the si tua tion 0 It
is not known how deeply the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) was involved in the drafting of the code. All that is
certain  is  that, following a meeting between Mr Kersten, General
Secretary of the ICFTU, and Mr Haferkamp, Vice-President of the Commission
and the Commissioner responsible for external relations, the Commission
announced in mid-July 1977 that the ICFTU could make an ~mportant
contribution to the drawing up of the code on the basis of its
experience. The assistance of the ICFTU could indeed be valuable since
it is said to have good relations with the few black trade unions in
South Africa.  t is at all events, important that the code should be
applied in close and trusting cooperation between the Communi 
authorities and the employers I and workers ' organizat ons since any
thought of implementing it must othen~ise be regarded as utopian. 
addition, the Council ought 'to consider mounting a campaign to give
publici ty to the code. The mass media in the Communi ty, particularly
television, should report in detail on its meaning and purpose. It 
simply not enough for the governments of the Nine, a few ambassadors
and the employers I and workers I associations to know about it. It is
important for the code to be understood and appreciated by the whole
of the European public  even though some may have reservations about it 
Nor would it do any harm to make the purpose of the code known to the
majori ty of th~ inhabi tants of the Republic of South Africa. Above all
it should be made clear that the Communi ty does not intend to set itself
up as an arbiter of morals. Its task is to explain that the aim of the
code is to bring home to the white population of Sodth Africa that it
can no longer avoid taking a number of decisions 
36. In addi tion l it is not only important to ensure strict and uniform
observance of the code by all the parties to whom it applies 0 It 
equally vi tal that the code should be applied in the same manner to all
Debates of the European Parliament, OJ No. 228, March 1978, p.
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it must be uniformly applied by all the Member Sta tes  It cannot be
denied that in the past some Member States have given their agreement to
the general political guidelines and then have shown little willingness
to apply them. If this attitude should repeat itself with regard to
implementation of the code of conduct, certain companies in some Member
states would be put to a greater disadvantage than others. Furthermore 
non-uniform application could even have a disintegrating effect on the
community itself.
~7  Parliament considers it rather remarkable, not to say illogical,
that although the initiative for the code of conduct was taken at
Community level, the Member States alone are respon3ible  for  enforcement
and supervision. It is therefore essential that the nine governments of
the Member states should agree on common formulae for the application of
the code. None of the nine member governments can have any interest in
adopting measures which in practice are implemented in different ways or
not at all. It would be giving direct help to the Republic of South
Africa if the nine Member states were to adopt measures which subsequently
were not applied. Therefore a careful check must be made on how things
are done in practice.
38. After some initial hesitation, the attitude of the industrial
associations in the Communi ty has become more posi tive  The trade unions 
particularly the German Trade Union Confederation and the Bri tish unions,
have declared their readiness to support the few black trade unions in
South Africa in pressing their demands. The Netherlands Association of
Enterprises has already agreed to observe the code of conduct  The
German industrial and business associations stated on 27 September 1977 
i. eo shortly after the publication of the code, that they would respect
the aim on which it was based and agreed to trans la te its principles
into practice. Even more importan't, however  is what the governments of
the Nine have done or will do to implement the code adopted by the nine
Foreign Ministers  For example, the government of ~he Federal Republic
of Germany stipulated in a cabinet decision taken as early as
November 1977 that West German firms wi th branches in South Africa would
not receive export guarantees if they did not undertake in writing to
observe the Communi ty' s code of conducto This was also revealed in the
answer to a written question by Mr Uwe Holtz  chairman of the German
Bundestag I S Commi ttee on Economic Cooperation.. Exporters must consequently
state that they are acting in the knowledge of and in agreement with the
declaration made by the central German industrial associations 
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Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the Council or the
Commission exactly what measures individual governments have taken to ensure
uniform application of the code in all the Communi ty countries. This is
the fundamental question which must be settled immediately if the code
is not to remain a dead letter. For if the governments of some Member
ta tes have not already taken the appropriate steps  companies in those
countries which have already taken measures to ensure observance of the
code will suffer a substantial competi ti ve disadvantage. Parliament
therefore considers the observance and uniform application of the code
of conduct by the governments of the Nine to be a matter of cardinal
importance.
39. A further problem should not be overlooked. EEC firms operating in
South Africa that act in accordance wi th the code; and in particular
satisfy the demand for ' equal pay for equal work' , may have great
difficulty in competing with South African firms  to which the code does
not apply. As European companies are mainly concentrated in the
processing sector and very much orientated towards the export trade,
they may be put at a serious competitive disadvantage. Has the
commission or any other body given any thought to how these firms can be
helped? Or will the European parent companies raise their prices and
transfer funds to their subsidiaries in South Africa. to keep them
competi ti ve?
40. Apart from its implementation and uniform application, supervision of
the code of conduct is the major problem. Paragraph 7 of the code is of
great importance in this respect. It reads:
. (a) Parent companies to which this code is addressed should
publish each year a detailed and fully documented report on
the progress made in applying this code.
(b) The number of black Africans employed in the undertaking should
be specified in the report, and progress in each of the six
areas indicated above should be fully covered.
The governments of the Nine will review annually progress made
in implemen ting this code  To this end a copy of each
company s report should be submitted to the national government.
(c)
As the text shows  companies are under an obligation but are not
compelled to publish a detailed documented report once a year to be
examined and assessed by the nine governments wi thin the framework of
political cooperation to determine what progress has been made.
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since it alone offers the possibility of exercising control. In practical
terms Par liament 8 s appeal to the Council is as follows : the Conference of
Foreign Ministers is urged to report annually on the effectiveness of the
code of conduct. The President of the Conference of Foreign Ministers
should give Parliament an assurance that the parliamentary institution of
the European Communities will receive an annual report on the observance of
the code of conduct by those Community firms which have their lega 1 and
actual headquarters in the Community and maintain subsidiaries in the
Republic of South Africa. Parliament also calls on the President-in-office
of the Counci 1 to submit to it a 11 company reports prepared in connection
with this code of conduct. To simplify matters, the rapporteur and a number
of other representatives of the Committee on Development and Cooperation
could be instructed to examine the company reports. It would be useful and
practical to set up a subcommittee or ad hoc committee of the Committee on
Deve lopment and Cooperation, as has been done in the Commi ttee on Budgets,
to take over the relevant control functions. Parliament should also be
informed when companies are not prepared to report on their conduct in the
face of the apartheid policy. Should the Council refuse to present an
annua 1 report to Par 1iament or to forward the company reports  the code of
conduct adopted by the nine Foreign Ministers would lose its Community
character ; the Council' s code of conduct would then become the code of
conduct of the nine Member States  However  since the ini tia ti ve was
originally taken within the framework of political cooperation, this cannot
in any sense have been the aim or the purpose of the decision.
420 The code ~ s succes s or fai lure therefore depends on how its observance
is monitored at Community level and whether the Council is prepared to
pub lish the reports prepared by companies and to report on them to the
European Par 1iament each year  During the general debate on political
cooperation which took place in Strasbourg on 15 November 1977 and during
which the oral question put by the Socialist Group to the Foreign Ministers
on the subj ect of action taken by the South African government against
opponents of the apartheid policy was discussed, the President-in-Office of
the Council and Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr Simonet, stated that observance
of the provisions of the code would be kept under constant review and that
a report would be submitted to the Foreign Ministers every year  No mention
was made of Parliament being involved in this procedure. In answer to a
wri tten question to the councill on action taken on the resolution of the
ACP-EEC Joint Committee of 1 December 1977, the Council described application
1 Written Question No. 942/77 by Mrs Goutmann to the Council of the
European Communities, OJ No~ C 72, 22. 1978, po 30
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working conditions of vast numbers of the people of South Africa, but the
answer again does not con~ain any indication of what the Council intends to
do to ensure. the application and supervision of the code or to inform
Par liament on its imp lementa tion and the resu Its achieved. A t the Joint
Committee 
a s meeting in Maseru (Lesotho) on 28 November - 1 December 1977,
the chairman of the European Parliament' s Socialist Group, Mr Fel1ermaier,
asked the President-in-Office of the Council whether the Council was
prepared to report to Parliament annually on the observance of the code.
In reply, the Belgian Minister responsible for developme~t affairs,
Mr Outers referred to paragraph 7 of the code of conduct and entered into
a binding commitment on behalf of the Council of Ministers that it would
inform the European Par liament on the app 1ication of the code.
On 10 May 1978, following the Council' s answer to
Oral Question No. 40 put to it by Mr Osborn , Mr Fel1ermaier
reminded Mr Andersen, President-in-Office of the Council and Danish Foreign
Minister  of what Mr Outers had said in Lesotho. He also asked the
following precisely worded question
: '
Are you willing to confirm today
that the statement of the President of the Development Council is to be
understood as meaning that the Council of the European Communities will
deliver this report in this House at the end of the first year of application
of the code? 1 0 The answer given to this question by the President-in-Office
was a definite  yes 
E & As quite enough words are exchanged in po li tics, but
in the final analysis only actions count, Parliament wishes to recall this
commi tment by the President-in-Officeo Moreover, since the code of conduct
has been applied for over a year, Parliament calls upon the responsible
Community authority to submit to it the first detailed report on the
effects the code has had.
43" Parliament regrets furthermore that the Foreign Ministers of the Member
States, when agreeing on the code of conduct, were unable to adopt a model
for the drawing up of company reports  The provision of a Communi ty mode 
for .the drawing up of annual reports would not only considerably facilitate
the work involved but a Iso contribute to the uniform application of the
code, wi thout which it wi 11 not succeed. According to an unofficial account,
foreign ministry experts discussed this question in Copenhagen. on
25 January 1978, but it is not yet known whether any joint solution was foundo
As Parliament regards this as an essential complement to the code of conduct,
it calls on the Community experts to make standard forms available
immediate ly to the companies for their annua 1 reports on measures taken to
comply with the code of conducto Since the first annual reports should
lready have been submi tted and these forms do not yet exist, it wi 11 be
interesting to see how these reports are set out8
What discussions have the Foreign Ministers of Member States had with the
South African government, and neighbouring ACP countries  about the impact
of the code of practice on producti vi ty as we 11 as wage leve Is and the
consequential impact on employment in South Africa?O (OJ Nol2I 230, Debates
of the European Parliament, May 1978, pp. 151f. - 28 - 
PE 540493/fi~
.. ..44. Systematic evaluation and publication of company reports is of great
importance if the Community s code of conduct is to contribute to an
improvement in the lot of non-white workers. Regular contacts with European
firms operating in South Africa are therefore essential. But who is to
correspond with the companies concerned? The Foreign Ministers meeting in
political cooperation, the Council of the European Communities, the Commission
or the national governments? Parliament takes the view that treatment of so
important a topic within the framework of political cooperation alone 
insufficient. It is also no secret that Parliament has so far not been kept
adequately informed within the framework of political cooperation When
the Foreign Ministers of the Nine met in Copenhagen on 14 February 1978,
the code of conduct was allegedly also discussed, but Parliament was not
informed. It should also he noted that the Council has not yet given a
formal answer that it will forward the company reports to Par liament.
45. Parliament therefore considers that the collection and evaluation of
the reports should be organized centrally and hopes that this important task
will be delegated to the Commission, since it regards the division between
Community activities ' and E political cooperation ' as artificial and woulq
like to see the Council involving the Commission fully in the process of
political cooperation. The deciding factor, however, is that Parliament
needs a competent body to which to address itself in order to ensure the
correct implementation of the code. For this reason, the whole question of
the code must be transferred to the Community level, i. e. from the Foreign
Ministers meeting in political cooperation to the Council. OnJy if there
is coordination between the Commission  the Counci 1 and Par liament is the
code like ly to be successfully applied and implemented. Par liament is after
all the only Co~~.rf111nity body in a position to put this policy into 
transparent form. It is therefore its responsibi Ii ty to ensure not on 
that the code of conduct is applied fairly but also that it is respected by
the companies concerned.
1 See report drawn up by Mr Blumenfeld on behalf of the Political Affairs
Committee on European political cooperation, Doc8 427/77.
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~l icat ion
46. As stated above; the code of conduct adopted by the foreign ministers
meeting in political cooperation does not have the force of law.. Companies
are merely urged to comply with it on a voluntary basia, particularly where
it concerns the equal treatment of white and black workers at the workplace.
Thus how effective the code is depends primarily on the willingness of
companies to abide by its provisions. The former President-in-Office of
the Council, Mr K. B. Andersen, explained it in these wo~ds: 'The observance
of the Nine I s code of conduct will of course primarily depend upon the extent
to which the individual companies feel an incentive to follow the recommenda-
\9  t~ons  Dur~ng the general debate on political cooperation on 15 November
1977 in Strasbourg during which the apartheid question and the code of
conduct were discussed in detail, the chairman of the Socialist Group,
Mr Fe1lermaier, called for wider economic sanctions against the South
African government to ensure observance of fundamental and human rights.
47. Neither the governments of the Nine nor the Community institutions
have sufficient legal means to impose sanctions on companies in South
Africa which are not willing to respect the code. Th~ e ar& in addition,
wide differences of opinion amongst the nine governments on the degree of
control that each individual Member state can exercise over private industry.
Because of the varying legislation in the Member States, whose economic
systems do not differ fundamentally, it has not been possible to back up
the code of conduct with legal sanctions  To take a practical example:
even if a country finds that a particular company with a~ branch in South
Africa is rot adhering to the code of conduct, it does not have any means
of fining the company or imposing other legal sanctions  The only available
sanction, which is not of a legal nature, would be moral censure. The
situation is the same at community level &
48.. An important point must be stressed here:  the code of conduct is not
concerned with Europe s attitude to economic relations with South Africa
its sole aim is to frustrate the apartheid laws on labour relations
to complementing the code of conduct with genuine economic sanctions, the
majori ty of the Member states are not in favour of a general economic
boycott  Moreover  under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a
general boycott may only be contemplated if peace is threatened or a
breach of the peace or an act of aggression has taken place. The Committee
Debates of the European Parliament, OJ No. 228, March 1978, po
30 - PE  54.. 493;E  in on Development and Cooperation does not believe that the situation in South
Africa, deplorable though it is, can be described in these terms.
49.. It is also doubtful whether a general economic boycott against South
Africa -would serve to overcome and abolish the apartheid system. The aim
of a boycott would be to force South Africa to change its course and eliminate
apartheid, i. ee the white minority government' s policy of preserving the
whi te population a s the state and of granti~g 'the blacks similar right 
only in their homelands and not in white areas. Normative recommendations
that aim at bringing about a change of course in the apartheid policy must
be based on a' clearly defined position. If the purpose is to increase the
prosperity and improve the working conditions of the non-white population 
and this is after all what the Community wants to achieve with its code - a
general economic boycott is neither the right method nor the best strategy
for it would hit the black population hardest.
50. A further question is whether ,the code of conduct can be supplemented
with specific measures such as a ban on investments or the cancellation 
export credit guarantees  Although the present text of the code placep
the emphasis on the demand for equal treatment of blacks and whites at
the workplace, the idea of economic sanctions has not been dropped by some
Member States. The Netherlands in particular seem to be pressing  for
specific boycott measure s again st South Afr ica . The Dutch feel that the
Member States of the Community ought to refuse to grant credit facilities
for a period 0  more than one year for export s to South Afr ica and that
t he code of conduct should include a ban on investments..
Confidence in the country. s economic future would undoubtedly be
particula.t: ~-
y ,_
haken by an investment ban.. At the same time, it would
produce a ~,harp rise in unemployment amongst people of all races. Calcula-
tions have shown that in all probability a total investment boycott in
1976 would have reduced the gross national product by hardly more than 5%.
The resulting unemployment would have affected approximately 40, 000 whites
and 80: 000 non-whites, to be laid off 
A boycott on South African exports would hit the South African economy
much harder than an investment boycott.. A 50% export boycott would do
considerable damage to South Africa balance of paymentso However, of
the 1. 1 million people who would lose their jobs as a result, about 850, 000
would be non-whites; of these the very poorest section of society would be
hardest hit, iD eo the 500, 000 employed primarily in mining and agriculture
An oil boycott could severely damage the South African economy I petroleum
being the only raw material which South Africa does not possess. But this
would take effect only in the long term since South Africa is already producing
oil from coala of which it has extensive reserves 
1 These figures were calculated by the well-known economist Professor Arnt
Spandauo See ~ Internationales Afrika-Forum- No. 12 19780 pp. 66  ff. 31 - PE 540 493 IfillHowever  boycott measures are difficult to supervise and are seldom
observed by all parties.. The latest and mos.t flagrant example is the case
of the three western oil companies which have been supplying Rhodesia with
oil despite the boycott  All economic sanctions against Rhodesia in the
past have been unsuccessfu13 and none of the governments of the Nine has
so far supported a proposal to put this right in the united Nations. It
is, moreover, no secret that many ACP countries, including those, like
Zambia, directly affected by the apartheid policy  continue to trade wi 
South Africa
51. In view of these circumstances very careful consideration should be
given in the Community to 'whether or not the code should be backed up
with economic sanctions  First of all a detailed examination must be made
of the extent to "vVhich companies have respected the code i s objectives and
whether and to what extent social improvements for the non-white labour
force have already been achieved  Racial discrimination at the workplace
was, for example, officially abolished in the South African iron and steel
industry l one of the most important sectors of the economy; in May 1978 
An agreement reached in Johannesburg between the trade unions and employers
makes no distinction between races in the allocation of jobs. The sole
criterion is to be the aptitude for the work concerned. This arrangement
is significant since approximately half a million workers are employed in
the South African steel .industry, and 80% of these are black. A similar
agreement had previously been reached in the metalworking industry.
Apartheid has likewise been abolished in a number of large theatres and
opera houses. The government in PreLoria leaves it to these places of
entertainment to decide whether performances should be given before audiences
of all raL p-s. Through the correct appl  cation of the code sufficient
pressure can thus be brought to bear on South Africa ~ s white government.
The fact that the Community did not immediately adop"t a threatening tone
or consider taking extreme measures, basically shows merely that it is
well aware of the negative consequences of boycott measures on the black
population. Furthermore, it gives the other side 3 chance to change its
policy. In future the Con~unity may well resort to more drastic methods
if South Africa does not modify the principles of its policies  however,
care must then be taken to ensure that such sanctions do not first harm
the very people whose legitimate rights we wish to defend  The legal.
experts of the Political Affairs Committee meeting in European political
cooperation ~ust in any case continue their deliberations on the sanctions
that can be imposed at Community level on companies which do not observe
See e very lnterestlng de ate ~n the European Parliament, OJ Noo 225,
Debates, January 1978, pp ~ 135 ff 
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technical and material aspects of the problem to determine how the economic
power of the European Community can be used to force Pretoria to make its
institutions more democratic if application of the code in its present
form proves unsuccessful.
52. A number of other conclusions must also be drawn  in  this context.
For example, Parliament feels that all cultural agreements between Community
countries and South Africa should be terminated, there being no greater con-
tradiction than the concept of culture on one hand and the concept of
apartheid on the other. The moral condemnation expressed with the adoption
of the code of conduct must give rise to other measures that logically
follow from it.
53. Of equal importance is that the principles underlying the Community
code should also be applied by the leading economic nations outside the
European Economic Community. Parliament therefore welcomes the fact that
the nine governments, immediately after the adoption of the code, encouraged
their OECD partners to abide by its provisions. It would, of course, be
better if there were a Community initiative to convince the other economic
partners, particularly the USA and Japan, of the code! s importance.
IV.  ~artheid policy and the Lome convention
54. Measures to eliminate apartheid can be taken both by the Member States
and by the European Community. Particular pressure ca~ also amanate from
the institutions set up under the Lome Convention - the ACP/EEC Consultative
Assembly and the body which prepares its work, the Joint Committee. ~er
the past two years both these bodies have made generous ' use of their right
to debate political problems directly affecting the countries that have
signed the Lome Convention and have referred to the political and practical
questions concerned.
It is only logical that the Committee on Development and Cooperation
should be the committee responsible for considering topical questions
relating to South Africa, such as the code of conduct and the apartheid
problem. Since this committee bears full responsibility for preparing and
organizing the work of the Joint Committee, there is no reason why these
should not be considered by the same committee in the European Parliament.
Development policy today is a complicated amalgam of moral, political,
commercial and domestic economic considerations. Consequently, the terms
of reference of the Committee on Development and Cooperation have changed
considerably, especially as development policy touches on many areas of
foreign policy and external economic policy.
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in Luxembourg which made detailed reference to the southern Afr ican problem.
In paragraph 17 of this resolution the Assembly stressed that ' the economic
situation of the member countries of the Convention of Lome engaged in
southern Africa in the joint struggle of the African peoples for independence
and against racialism is part of a political crisis in which the EEC must
concern itself, necessitating the use of special measures within the frame-
work of the Convention; the Assembly welcomes, in this connection, the
use made of the provisions of the Convention relating to exceptional aid,
and recognizes that in view of the worsening of the crisis, further and
more urgent help will be needed' Paragraph 19 reads: ' Requests all
signatory states of the Convention to observe with the utmost strictness
the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, the OAU and the recent
Maputo Conference in support of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and the
Republic of South Africa for independence, the unequivocal affirmation of
the principle of majority rule and the equality of all peoples in this area 
My Cheysson, the Commissioner responsible for development policy,
welcomed these paragraphs of the resolution as they made the Commission I
task easier. "He also pointed to the many economic and political difficulties
which have arisen in southern Africa because of the maintenance of the
apartheid policy." The Community, he said, therefore had a moral duty to
help the governments and peoples of this region.
56. At the Joint Committee' s meeting in  Maseru, Lesotho, (28 November
1 December 1977), a country particularly hard hit by South Africa
apartheid policy, the political discussions centred on this question. 
underline the importance of this question, the Joint Committee even decided
to adopt a special resolution on the political situation in southern
Africa In paragraph 3 of the resolution the ~int C=ittee expresses
the opinion that the situation in South Africa constitutes an immediate
threat to international peace and security and unequivocally condemns
the efforts of the South African government to maintain apartheid.
At its  meeting in Grenada (29 May - 1 June 1978) the Joint Committee
again adopt~d a special resolution on the political situation in southern
-:.
Africa This not only condemns racialist policies but also welcomes
at some length the code of conduct adopted by the European Economic
Community. It also calls for further measures to end economic cooperation
with the South African government.
See OJ No. C 272, 11.11. 1977, p$
For complete text see Annex III
For complete text see Annex IV
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further resolution, Part C of which was concerned exclusively with the
political situation in southern AfriQa. The resolution contained a
strong condemnation of the non-compliance by three major European oil
companies for the boycott against Rhodesial and stressed the Community
efforts to influence multinational companies with the aid of the code of
conduct.
57.. Whilst the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique
and Namibia have assumed a special pl~ce in international politics, little
attention is paid to the ' front-line ' states in southern Africa: Botswana,
Lesotho, SWaziland and Zambia. Only the European Economic Community has
taken any real interest in these states and granted them special aid under
t he Lome Convention..
Even when the Lome Convention was being drawn up, Botswana, Swaziland
and Lesotho assumed a special status within the group of States eligible
for association since at that time they formed, with the Republic of South
Africa, the South African Customs Union. This customs union with a state
which cannot be regarded as a developing country and for which there was
no prospect of association with the EEC for both economic and above all
political reasons, could, in the Community s view, have resulted in specific
problems requixing special clarification (Protocol No. 22, Part I (3)) .
The three countries therefore undertook, in a joint declaration (Annex XII
to the Lome Convention)  to apply the same customs tax-iff treatment to
imports originating in the Community as they applied to those originating
in the Republic of South Africa (most-favoured-nation clause pursuant to
Article 7 (2) and to ensure through their customs arrangements and through
the application of the agreed rules on origin (Article 2 of the Lome
Convention in conjunction with Protocol No. 1) that there would be no trade
deflection to the detriment of the Community..
58  The front-line states attach particular importance to the provisions
of Article 59 of the Lome Convention, under which a total of 150 million
u. a.. has been made available for exceptional aid to the ACP states until
the expiry of the 4th European Development Fund.. Aid has been granted not
only to the front-line states but also to Zaire and Malawi, whose
economies were particularly hard hit by the hostilities in Angola The
provisions of Article 59 have proved very beneficial to the front-line
states, and particularly Lesotho, especially as they have suffered considerable
For complete text see Annex V
See a report on Community aid to these states in r Information , Commission
of the European Communities,  The European Community and southern Africa I 
No.. 166/77
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Africa. This exceptional aid, coupled with the Cowmunity s normal ~ayments,
has strengthened the economic and PQlitical resistance of the countries
directly affected by apartheid and helped to loosen South Africa 8 s tight
grip on them.
59. The exceptional aid the Community grants to the countries particularly
hard hit by apartheid should not be seen merely a s an admini strati ve act
on the part of the Commission. It also quite clearly has a political
aspect. This was brought out in the European Parliament - s debate on
South Africa on 12 January 1977, when, following an oral question .tabled
on behalf of the Socialist Group to the Community s Foreign Ministers on
the Member states' common policy towards southern Africa, both Commissioner
Cheysson and the then President-in-Office of the Council, the British
Foreign Minister Mr Cr.osland emphasized the Community. s solidarity with
the people and nations affected by South Africa' s apartheid policy, and
particularly Lesotho Similarly, at its first working meeting in December
1976 in Lome, the EEC-ACP Committee of Ambassadors called for active support
to be given to Lesotho. The second meeting of the EEC-ACP Council of
Ministers in Suva has also given a detailed report on the special situation
in Le sot ho .
60. The Community has also helped some countries in southern Africa which
have not acceded to the Lome Convention. e. g. Angola and Mozambique. Although
these two countries have not yet given a positive answer to the Community
suggestion that they accede to the Convention, there are three types of
cooperation already in existence between them and the Community. Fir stly 
the system of general preferences is applied to imports from these countries.
Secondly  Mozambique and Angola have received food aid and medical supplies..
Thirdly, there are certain indirect advantages arising for Mozambique out
of its inclusion in three regional projects. Angola and Mozambique do,
of course, still have the opportunity of signing the Lome Convention.
See Debates of the European Parliament, OJ Annex No 0 211# January 1977 
pp.
96 ff..
- 36 PE 54.493/fin,61 . In the light of experience wi th Lom~ I and the negotia tions tha 
have already begun on a new agreement with the ACP, the Community must
define clearly wha t importance it ttaches to Africa in its poli tical
calcula tions G In the pas t the Communi ty made the very bad poli tical
mistake of hesi tating too long, despi te numerous adnlonitions from the ACP,
before using the means at its disposal to help solve the conflict in
southern Africa. Since then, however, the Communi ty has realized that
tolera tion of a whi te-minori ty gOvernment in Sou th Africa and maintenance
of good relations with the ACP are incompatible. This 1:e.came very clear
at the end of 1977 at the meeting of the ACP Council of Ministers in Lusaka
and above all a t the Joint Co~i ttee I s meeting in Maseru. The conflict in
and around South Africa is not only a subject of increasing concern to the
insti tutions of the Lome Convention; it is also threatening to become a real
burden on its work. This was clearly revealed in Lesotho. If aid to Zaire
could not even be coordina ted wi thin the framework of the Lome Conven tion,
when and where can poli tical problems be discussed and resolved? The
Communi ty mus t there fore make every a ttempt to give a new dimension to
political cooperation with the ACP in the Convention still to be negotiated.
In addi tion, every effort must be made to increase the special aid granted
to the ACP Sta tes in southern Africa affected by the apartheid policy.
Thought might be given to the creation of a special action programme and
the extension of the possibi1i ties for which provision is made in Article
59 of the Lom~ Convention, particularly by increasing. the funds at present
limi ted to 150 million u.
The European Communi tv mus t develop i ts own s tra tegy for resol vinq
the South Africa problem
62.. The aggrava tion of old conflicts and the emergence of new ones in
Africa, particularly its sou thern pe rt, should really have made it clear
to the European Communi ty tha t it is no longer possible to react to each
new development in Africa wi th  ad hoc measures.. The virtual absence of a
considered and coherent Africa policy on the part of the Communi ty and of
the West as a whole became apparent as early as 1975/76 at the time of the
Angela crisis..
63 
.. 
Why, it may be asked here, should the Communi ty pay particular a tten-
tion to the problem of South Africa? There are, after all, many other
countries in the world where the most fundamental of basic rights are
similarly viola ted.. The seeds of conflict in the Republic of South Africa
now lie so thick on the ground tha t, unless there is fundamental change,
- 37 - PE 54 o493/fin.the danger of an explosion and a tragic confrontation cannot be discounted 
However, this threat hangs not only over South Africa - and this is the
decisive point - but over the entire African continent and, in all like-
lihood, over Europe . s economic, poli tical and s - tra tegic rela tions wi 
tha t continent. The communi ty must therefore try, using a variety of means 
to put pressure on South Africa to imprQve the human rights situation.
In this, there should be no attempt to promote specific political inter~sts
or impose moral judgments. On the contrary, the main thrust of any
action should be aimed at preventing a situation from arising  in  which
a further consolidation of the attitudes at present determining the form
of South African society and relations between the individual races might
lead to an explosion, the consequences of which would be unforeseeable
not only for the country itself but for international relations as 
whole. Pressure must be brought to bear on the policy of apartheid in
this region while there is still time, so as to safeguard the basic right
of all ethnic groups, including the white population, to exist.
64 . The Republic of South Africa is particularly dependent on foreign
trade. Just how dependent, however  is very hard to assess from outside,
since details on a number of the largest interna tional trade items, such
as oil and arms imports, are kept secret. Various statistical data have
been used to show that South Africa is of little importance to the
Communi ty as regards trade and is not irreplaceable as a supplier of raw
materials. This is not so, South Africa being - whether we like it or
not - the economic giant of the African continent. South Africa may be
geographically remote from Europe, but it is nevertheless of the grea tes t
strategic and economic importance for us. One has only to consider the
shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope and the country s wealth of
raw ma terials  Over one million tonnes of oil are shipped to Europe and
America around the sou thern tip of Africa each day  Ai though it has
only 6% of the total population of Africa, South Africa produces and
consumes more than 50% of the continent ' s electrici ty and accounts for
about one third of its total GNP, more than one fifth of its agricultural
output, about 30% of its exports and 25% of its imports The country
possesses over 70% of world gold reserves and is, wi th 76% of world
reserves, the world' s largest supplier of chrome ores  coming before
Rhodesia and the USSR. It also has the world' s largest reserves of
See Annex VI
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ore, fluori te, diamonds, uranium, hard coal, silver, nickel, ti tanium,
lead, tin, zinc, copper  magnesi te and phospha tes . Blue asbes tos, a high-
grade insulating ma terial, is found exclusively in South Africa. It is
therefore not surprising that 70% of South Africa s exports consist of
raw ma terials. Since the European continent is poor in raw ma terials, it
is in the Communi ty ' s interests that its various trade relations wi th South
Africa should not be severed. The Communi ty should therefore be extremely
interested in a peaceful solution being found to the internal conflicts in
the Republic of South Africa. What is false, however, is the belief of
many Europeans that this is possible only if the  status  , including
apartheid, is preserved. The preserva tion of prosperi ty and order in
South Africa and the communi ty ' s trade rela tions wi th this country is not
a question of military strength but of political wisdom.
65. A few comments on the subject of uranium should be made at t~is juncture.
South Africa appears to be assuming the posi tion of one of the world I
most important producers of natural uranium. It is expected that production
of uranium oxide, which amounted to 3, 265 tonnes in 1976 and has increased
to 5, 300 tonnes in 1978, will reach 8, 5QO tonnes by 1981. In view of the
tough posi tion adopted by the USA on uranium and of the si tuation on the
world market, where competing countries such as Australia and Canada
have imposed extremely harsh condi tions of supply and also cut back their
production of uranium, South Africa is becoming the most important supplier.
The quest10n thus arises as to how far Europe is, or will become, dependent
on South African uranium. Can the European Co~~unity put any political
pressure or impose economic sanctions on South Africa if it is dependent
on the la tter for its urani um supplies? These are exremely delica te poli-
tical questions, but they have to be taken into consideration if economic
sanctions are to be introduced as a means of putting an end to apartheid.
Since the Communi ty has no way in ei ther the short or the long term of
bringing poli tical influence to bear on the five uranium-producing countries
(USA, Canada, Australia, South Africa, USSR), it would be well advised to
diversify its sources of uranium supply as widely as possible.
66. A general economic boycott of South Africa could undoubtedly lead to
a number of difficu1 ties for the European Communi ty because of its dep-
endence on various raw ma terials. The Federal Republic of Germany, for
example  imports one third of its uranium requirements from South Africa,
and the same applies to chrome ore  half of Germany I s unrefined copper,
too, comes from South Africa. Economic re1a tions wi th Sou th Africa are
very extensive in other fields, too. Foreign trade between the Communi ty
- 39 - PE 54.493 /fin.and South Africa, amounts to about $ 10, 000 million annually, Community
firms have some 1, 000 subsidiaries or affiliates in the Republic of South
Africa, 60% of all foreign investment is from European countries. In view
of the increa sing number  ot  unemployed in the Community - the figure rose to
9 million in July 1978 - many undertakings, and also several governments,
would certainly do all they could to circumvent any such economic boycott.
The deliveries of oil to Rhodesia, which came to light in 1978, are a per-
tinent example in this connection.
Of interest in this connection is a document published by the UN at
the end of August 1978 listing all undertakings which have evaded the
sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on trade with South Africa and
Rhodesia. The Security Council has prohibited all trade with Rhodesia
since 1968 and all sales of arms to South Africa since 1977. The list,
which was drawn up by the UN subcommittee on the abolition of racial dis-
crimination and the protection of minorities, shows that, despite the trade
boycott, 593 firms continue to trade with Rhodes (444 British, 92 American,
20 Swiss, 17 Dutch, 8 South African, 6 West German, 2 Japanese, 1 Austrian,
1 Belgian, 1 French and 1 Canadian), whilst 43 other firms have sold arms to
South Africa. The document does not specify, however, whether these sales
took place before or after the 1977 embargo. (The firms involved include
20 French, 9 British, 5 American, 3 Italian, 3 Israeli, 1 West German,
1 Spanish and 1 Swiss.
The Community is right to pursue a policy - including the exertion
of  some  pressure - aimed at persuading South Africa to change its apartheid
policy  This at the moment would be a better approach than the imposition
of economic sanctions, especially as there are a nlli~ber ~f factors restricting
the community s room for manoeuvre8 or at least tha-t area in which it can
act without major difficulties. strict application of the code of conduct
could be a step in the right direction here, particularly if it were to
prove possible to secure acceptance of the d~mand for equal treatment of
blacks and whites at the place of work. Far more important than economic
sanctions against South Africa at the moment is consideration of possible
measures to be taken against Community-registered firms which violate the
cod e 
67. Mr Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, revealed the United states
new policy on Africa in Lusaka in April 1976. This unambiguously co~~itted
the United States to supporting the interests of black Africa - the creation
of black majority governments while safeguarding white minority rights.
- 40 - PE 54.493 jfinOn 28 September 1976 the German Foreign Minister, Mr Genscher, stated
in the UN that the majority government should also guarantee the right of
existence of the white minority.. The replacement of the internal South
African regime by the particularly democratic ' one man - one vote system
should bring nearer a solution to the conflict in South Africa.. However,
ne i ther the Community nor the Member States nor the Uni ted States have yet
developed or defined objectives which could produce such a policy. The
Community, which has important securi ty and economic interests in South Africa,
therefore has a special role to play in bringing about a shift in policy
through peace ful means.
68. However, the Community ' s policy has so far been characterized by a lack
of imagination.. ' The main characteristics of European cooperation with regard
to Africa are our helplessness and our inability to act, combined with the fact
on the question of taking specific- action the opportu..'*1i ties for exchanging views
that
or information and discussing policies between parliareent and Council are
non-existent or thoroughly inadequate. The fact is that every time anything
noteworthy has happened in Africa, the European Community has been unable
to act as a co~unity It is also incomprehensible that the Co~unity
should merely reaffirm the views already expressed in various UN resolution~.
. How two-faced bhe UN and many of its member states are, has become
abundantly clear during discussions of the problems connected with southern
Africa  Many states that condemn the internal policies of Rhodesia and
South Africa are extEemely lenient in their assessment of violations of
human rights within their own frontiers. It is simply unacceptable that
the Community should regard as sacrosanct UN resolutions whieh have seldom
led to the protection of minorities and democratic freedoms in Africa
(Angolag Mozambique) .. The European Community should itself think about
the southern African problem and form its own opinions. It is intolerable
that it should permit its thinking to be dictated by others.
Speech by Mr Blurn~nfeld, Debates of the EP, OJ Annex No. 231, June 1978,
p..
123
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23 February 1976, voiced its clear condemnation of the system of aparthe~d
in South Africa. It has discussed the major African issues on repeated
occasions in the framework of European political cooperation. However,
wi th the exception of the code of conduct, the Community has developed
no specific formula for resolving the South Africa question. Although it
discusses the matter regularly, it contents itself with statements calling
for majority government in Namibia and Rhodesia and strongly condemning
South Africa I s apartheid policy. The Community has unfortunately yet to
realize that statements of this kind are no substit~te for a policy and
might well have exactly the opposite effect to what is intended. Despite
a few tenati ve steps in the right direction, the statements made so far
do "not suffice to permit a constructive or consistent policy towards the
Republic of South Africa.  realpolitik towards South Africa simply does
not exist. But just what should such a policy entail?
70. The goal of a  realpolitik must in all events,. be to get South Africa
to adopt certain attitudes towards changing its racist domestic policy.
If this goal  is  to be achieved, it will first be necessary to clear up a 
misunderstanding: the Republic of South Africa is not a colony and white
South Africans are not Europeans living ,in Africa. Unlike Namibia or
Rhodesia at the present time, or Algeria or Angola in the pastq indeed,
unlike most African states, the issue in South Africa is not to find a
solution to a colonial conflict. The main issue is to eliminate a system
to which all democrats and all men of good will throughout the world are
oppos ed : the system of apartheid.
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Only when this has been clearly understood by the politicians concerned
in the Community will it become possible to develop a strategy likely to
be in any way effective in putting an end to South Africa' s disastrous
racial policy. The Community cannot be regarded as making a constructive
contribution towards ending racial discrimination until  condemnation of
~artheid is accompanied by a concept which unambiguously lays down the
basis for the rights  of  co-existence, Ef.QI.?erly enforced,  of  white and brown
South Africans , since adequate guarantees for all ethnic groups are essential
if a peaceful solution to the racial conflict is to be found.. If the
Community wants to prevent a catastrophe in South Africa, it has no choice
but to put forward, in the near future, constructive alternative proposals..
This will, however, require a great deal of skill and care.
72.. Although most African states have been associated with the European
Community tor years under the Yaounde and Lome Conventions, Africa has
remained one of the great areas of misunderstanding for Europe. This is
principally due to the fact that the Community does not have the institutional
structure to make an effective contribution towards the solution of major
crises in Africa. It should not be a matter of working out an effective
concept in an  ad hoc manner for each individual cr1S~S  what we need above
all is a long-term Community strategy for the whole of Africa.. Africa to-
day is a continent in which the fate of Europe rests. It is therefore in
Europe 6, s intere st to play an active part in working for peace in Africa 
Those who help the Africans to overcome their internal conflicts will,
at the end of the day, have a closer relationship with them than those who
exploit existing divisions for their own political ends. The European
Community must become more conSC10US of its respo~sibility as a power for
peace not only in Europe in relations between East and West, but also, and
to an increasing extent, 1n relations between the industrial world and
the developing countries..
13.. It is quite simply a fact that the Community s approach to African
problems ~ particularly in southern Africa, will have a decisive effect
on Europe 4 s relations with the countries of the Lome Convention.. The
Lome agreement is primarily economic in character, it is true, but there
can be no denying the political effects of the cooperation between Europe
and Africa taking place under this agreement.. This became very clear during
- 43 PE 54.. 493  fin.the most recent meetings of the ACP-EEC Joint Committee and Consultative
Assembly. Just as the ACP states have every right to ask the Community
what position it is adopting towards apartheid in South Africa, so should
the question of the right of white ~fricans to live in the Republic of
South Africa be discussed in the Lom~ institutions. This would not only
contribute to a solution of the conflict but also make cooperation between
the ACP and the EEC easier. It would be no more than logical if the new
Convention which is to follow the Lom~ agreement were to form the basis
for a more active European policy in Africa.
The negotiations for the renewal of the Convention, or its
renegotiation, thus take on a particular significance. Economic aid, however,
will only achieve its goal if the community resolves to make this aid more
substantial and to begin a long overdue reappraisal of Africa. We must
take this continent seriously, because it is worth taking seriously.
- 44 - PE 54. 493/fin .ANNEX I
Text of the Declaration adopted by the Foreign Ministers of
the Member states and published at the end of the political
cooperation meetinq held in Luxembourg on 23 F~bruary 1976.
1. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Nine countries of the
Community meeting in Luxembourg and recalling the decisions which they
have adopted with regard to the People s Republic of Angola, examined
the problems arising in that area of Africa.
2. It is with great attention and considerable concern that the Minis
have followed events in Angola which have resulted in great suffering,
loss of many human lives and serious damage to the economy. They call
for the re-establishment of the peaceful situation necessary for the
reconstruction and development of Angola.
3. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs consider that it is for the Ango.
people to settle its own destiny. In this connection, they expressed 
regard for the efforts made by the DAU to find an African solution to 
difficulties, and eschewed anything which might interfere with a succes~
outcome. They condemned all external military intervention and expres~
the firm hope that this would soon be brought to an end. In the interE
of the prosperity of the region they hoped that peaceful and constructi~
co-operation would be established, presupposing friendly relations betwE
the African states involved.
The Ministers confirmed the basic position of the Nine Member StatE
of the Community:
- readiness on the part of the Nine to develop co-operation to thE
extent that such relations are desired by African states, and 
rejection of any form of action by any state aimed at the creatj
of a sphere of influence in Africa,
- respect for the independence of all African States and the sover
right of these States to define their national policy without 
interference,
- support for DAD measures to promote African co-operation,
- the right of the Rhodesian and Namibian peoples to self-determin
and independence,
- condemnation of the apartheid policy of South Africa.
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Code of Conduct for companies with subsidiaries
branches or representation in South Afri
Relations within the undertakinq
(a) Companies should ensure that all their employees irrespective of
racial or other distinction are allowed to choose freely and without
any hindrance the type of organization to represent them.
(b) Employers should regularly and unequivocally inform the ir employees
that consultations and collective bargaining with organizations
which are freely elected and representative of employees are part
of company policy..
(c) Should black African employees decide that their representative
body should be in the form of a trade union, the company should
accept this decision. Trade unions for black Africans are not
illegal, and companies are free to recognize them, and to negotiate
and conclude agreements with them.
(d) consequently, th~ companies should allow collective bargaining with
organizations freely chosen by the workers to develop in accordance
with internationally accepted principles.
(e) Employers should do everything possible to ensure that black African
employees are free to form or to join a trade union. steps should
be taken in particular to permit trade union officials to explain
to employees the aims of trade unions and the advantages of member-
ship, to distribute trade union documentation and display trade
union notices on the company I s premises, to have reasonable time
off to carry out their union duti~s without loss of pay and to
organize meet ings 
Where works or liaison committees already operate, trade union
officials should have representative status on these bodies if
employees so wish. However, the existence of these types of
committee should not prejudice the developm8nt or status Qf trade
unions or of their representatives..
~rant labour
(a) The system of migrant labour is, in South Africa, an instrument of
the policy of apartheid which has the effect of preventing the
indi vidual from seeking and obtaining a job of his choice: it also
causes grave social and family problems..
(b) Employers have the social responsibility to contribute towards en-
suring freedom of movement for black African workers and. their
(c)
families.
In the meantime employers should make it their concern to alleviate
as much as possible the effects of the existing system.
lBulletin EC No. 9/77  page 46 et seq.
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Companies should assume a special responsibility as regards the pay
and conditions of employment of their black African employees. They should
formulate specific policies aimed at improving their terms of employment.
Pay based on the absolute minimum necessary for a family to survive cannot
be considered as being sufficient. The minimllin wage should initially
exceed by at least 50% the minimum level required to satisfy the basic
needs of an employee and his family.
~e structure and black African advancement
(a) The principle of  equal pay for equal work  means that all jobs
should be open to any worker who possesses suitable qualifications,
irrespective of racial or other distinction, and that wages should
be based on a qualitative job evaluation~
(b) The same pay scales should be applied to the same work. The
adoption of the principle of equal pay would, however, be meaningless
if black African employees were kept in inferior jobs. Employers
should therefore draw up an appropriat~ range of training schemes
of a suitable standard to provide training for their black African
employees, and should reduce their dependence on immigrant white
labour.
Fringe benefits
(a) In view of their social responsibilities, undertakings should
concern themselves with the living conditions of their employees
and fami  ie s .
(b) For this purpose company funds could be set aside for use:
- in the housing of black African personnel and their families,
- in transport from place of residence to place of work and back,
- in providing leisure and health service facilities,
- in providing their employees with assistance in problems they
encounter with the authorities over their movement from one
place to another, their choice of residence and their employment,
- in pension matters,
- in educational matters,
- in improving medical services, in adopting programmes of insurance
against industrial accidents and unemployment, and in other
measures of social welfare.
Desegregation at places of work
In so far as it lies within their own competence, employers should
do everything possible to abolish any practice of segregation, notably
at the workplace and in canteens, sports acti vities, education and
training.
staff.
They should also ensure equal working conditions for all their
- 47 - PE 54. 493/Ann. II /"fin..7 . ~orts on the im2lementation of the code of conduct
(a) Parent companies to which this code is addressed should publish
each year a detailed and fully documented report on the progress
made in applying this code.
(bj The number of black Africans employed in the undertaking should
be specified in the report, and progress in each of the six
areas indicated above should be fully covered.
(c) The governments of the Nine will review annually progress made
in implementing this code. To this end a copy of each company t s
report should be submitted to the national government.
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RESOLUTION
of the Joint Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the ACP-EEC
Convention of Lome on the political situation in southern Africa (adopted
at Maseru (Lesotho) on 1 December 1977)
The Joint Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the ACP-EEC
Convent ion of Lome:
Pay~ tribute to the courage of the peoples and governments of
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, which have established multiracial
societies in which people of all races can live together in harmony,
and re-affirms its solidarity with them;
Recal' ls the special measures already taken for the benefit of these
countries and requests that they be stepped up, where necessary,
within the framework of a special programme;
3 . Considers that the situation in South Africa constitutes an
immediate threat to international peace and security and condemns
unequivocally the efforts of the South African government and the
illegal Rhodesian regime to maintain and reinforce the oppression
in these countries through their policies of . ap3rtheid, continuous
and increasingly blatant violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms and acts of agression against neighbouring countries;
Pays solemn tribute to the thousands of men: women and children who
are paying with their lives or suffering torture and imprisonment
for their right to live a free and independent life.
- 49 PE 54. 493/Ann. III / fin.ANNEX IV
JO INT COMMI TTEE
RESOLUTION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF
THE ACP-EEC LOME CONVENTION ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN
sou'rHERN AFRICA
(adopted at St George I S, Grenada, on 1 June 1978)
The Joint Committee of the ACP-EEC Consultativa Assembly
- Reaffirming its resolution on the political situation in Southern
Africa adopted in Maseru (Lesotho) on 1 December 1977,
- Noting with concern the ~ontinuing harassment and suffering of the
peoples and Governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia,
Condemns without question all regimes that practice racialist
policies and apartheid;
Pays tribute to the courage of the non-racialist peoples and
Governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland ~nd Zambia and
reaffirms its solidarity with them;
3 . Urges that the special measures already taken for their benefit
be stepped up and in particular that a special action programme
be instituted urgently for them;
Notes with satisfaction the efforts being made by the Community
to influence the conduct of multinational companies operating 
South Africa, in particular through the estab ishment of a code of
conduct for companies operating in that couptry, and urges further
speedy action to end the collaboration of these companies with the
apartheid Government in its oppression of the non-white people of
South Africa.
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Part of the Resolution of the ACP-EEC Consultative As3embly meeting on
29 September 1978, covering the political situation in southern Africa
26. Recalls the resolution on the situation in southern Africa adopted
by its Joint Committee in Maseru (Lesotho) on 1 December 1977
and paragraph 17 of the resolution of the ACP-EEC Consultative
Assembly in Luxembourg in' June 1977;
27. Condemns the racialist policy of apartheid pursued by South Africa,
pays tribute to the courage of the peoples and governments of
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia and reaffirms its solidarity
with them;
28. Urg~s that the special measures already taken for their benefit be
stepped up and in particular that a special action programme be
instItuted urgently for them;
29. Strongly condemns the violation of the embargo on Rhodesia by three
maj or European oil companies and requests that vigorous action be
taken by the Community with a view to putting an end to the
collaboration of these companies with the racialist regimes 
PRETORIA and SALISBURY, and that effective sanctions be rapidly
applied in the event of violations;
30. Strongly condemns the decision by South Africa to organize elections
in Namibia unilaterally and calls for the immediate holding of
free elections under UN supervision, to be prepared in close
collaboration with all the representative forces of the Namibian
people;
31. Welcomes the Community s efforts to influence the conduct of
multinational companies in South Africa, in particular through the
establishment of a code of conduct for companies operating in that
country;
32. Urges further speedy action to end the collaboration of these
companies with the Government of South Africa;
33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report by
Mr Guillabert
l to the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers and the Commission
of the European Communities.
Doc  ACP-EEC lO/78
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General notes on trade relations
between the EEC and South Africa
and foreign investment in that country
1.. Trade re lations
South Africa has a chro~ic trade deficit. In 1976 it amounted to
300 million us dollars, including 700 million US dollars with the
Communi ty 
South Africa also has a chronic balance-of-payments deficit in goods and
services but this is normally offset by non-monetary sales of gold and net
capi tal infl~s (in 1976,. 3, 000 million us dollars on the one side and 2, 700
million us dollars on the other side of the balance sheet) .
South Africa is a vital source of raw materials for the West' s industrial
and "de fence requirements. These include:
Products Producer countries
South Africa
percentage of total
Western 2roduction
Industrial diamonds Zaire and South Africa 85%
Platinum South Africa and Rhodesia 75%
Vanad i  South Africa 60%
Chrome Sou  Afr ica and Rhodes  90%
Manganese South Africa 30%
The Community depends on South Africa to a large extent for supplies of the
above raw materials. Community imports from South Africa in 1975 expressed as
a percentage of total imports were as follows:
Industrial diamonds
Manganese
(approximately 85%)
40%
33% Urani urn
Chr omi urn
Platinum
20%
16%
The following tables indicate trading patterns between South Africa
and its major economic partners and EEC/South African trade.
52 - PE 54 o 493/ANN. VI/fin.D
E
V
E
!
J
.
~
!
'
~
~
~
:
'
 
C
~
 
T
P
_
l
\
D
E
 
S
E
r
v
V
E
:
:
~
J
 
S
0
t
:
T
H
 
A
.
.
F
i
'
:
C
A
,
 
T
i
i
E
 
E
E
C
T
H
E
 
U
S
A
 
A
N
D
 
,
-
P
A
.
.
.
"
'
;
"
-
T
"
,
,
\
"
.
 
-
-
-
 
-
 
"
"
 
-
.
:
.
.
 
-
 
.
"
"
\
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
;
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
7
6
/
-
1
 
p
e
r
 
~
e
n
t
 
a
g
e
d
e
v
'
e
 
l
~
'
Q
(
"
"
'
.
e
:
-
.
.
 
'
:
.
.
.
O
'
"
"
'
A
'
r
 
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
 
,
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
"
"
\
3
 
,
 
2
 
9
6
-
i
 
,
0
"
+
0
"
"
'
"
 
-
0
 
,
0
9
9
:
5
 
,
 
.
2
0
0
-
 
-
J
.
 
J
.
.
 
)
U
 
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
 
1
:
 
'
-
 
=
"
'
 
.
.
.
:
;
1
'
,
.
.
.
.
.
"
"
1
.
.
.
0
,
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
:
.
:
.
.
.
 
=
f
r
o
m
T
h
e
 
E
E
C
 
~
 
i
 
n
e
(
1
,
9
5
5
)
1
 
,
 
5
2
5
9
1
4
2
 
,
 
9
6
8
1
3
1
2
,
 
5
5
0
U
n
i
 
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
9
4
0
6
8
8
7
4
0
0
1
2
1
 
,
 
2
0
0
9
5
0
.
.
.
.
O
t
h
e
r
 
~
e
r
n
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
1
,
0
1
3
8
3
7
1
7
4
1
4
'
 
9
5
6
8
2
6
1
 
,
6
0
0
-
 
-
-
 
-
U
S
A
6
5
9
5
3
9
6
2
2
9
9
8
.
 
1
,
0
7
7
1
5
0
 
.
 
-
J
 
a
 
p
a
 
n
4
1
0
3
1
1
4
4
7
7
3
8
5
5
0
.
.
.
 
.
~
.
.
.
.
.
T
O
T
A
L
 
E
X
P
O
R
T
S
9
7
3
2
2
8
2
"
 
7
0
4
 
4
,
 
1
1
4
2
7
3
4
 
,
0
0
0
.
-
 
"
'
"
t
o
:
T
h
e
 
E
E
C
 
~
i
n
e
0
0
3
,
1
2
5
1
,
 
4
6
8
1
 
~
 
9
0
9
1
,
 
9
3
7
1
 
,
 
9
0
0
-
 
-
-
.
-
U
n
i
 
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
5
8
8
6
2
1
8
1
9
9
7
6
9
8
8
9
5
0
.
.
 
.
.
,
-
 
-
O
t
h
e
r
 
H
e
r
r
.
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
4
1
5
5
0
4
6
4
9
9
3
2
9
4
8
9
5
0
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
 
-
.
 
"
"
-
-
.
.
.
.
U
S
A
1
7
0
1
7
3
1
9
1
2
9
2
4
7
0
4
0
0
.
.
.
l
~
:
-
 
-
J
a
p
a
n
2
5
7
3
0
6
2
8
8
5
2
8
5
3
3
4
5
0
-
 
-
.
 
-
T
R
A
D
E
 
B
A
I
A
.
J
.
l
C
E
W
a
r
 
l
d
2
 
,
0
6
9
1
 
,
 
0
6
8
3
3
6
.
.
.
.
1
,
 
9
2
4
-
1
,
8
2
6
-
1
,
2
0
0
T
h
e
 
E
E
C
 
N
i
n
e
9
5
2
)
4
0
0
4
4
6
-
:
:
.
 
,
0
5
9
.
.
:
.
1
,
1
9
4
6
5
0
U
n
i
 
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
3
5
2
2
1
2
O
t
h
e
r
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
-
5
9
8
3
3
3
5
2
5
-
1
,
0
2
4
8
7
8
6
5
0
U
S
A
4
8
9
3
6
6
4
3
1
7
0
6
6
0
7
7
5
0
J
a
p
a
n
1
5
3
1
5
9
2
1
0
1
3
6
1
0
0
1
 
.
.
 
0
4
 
7
 
7
6
1
2
1
7
1
.
 
1
9
2
7
0
2
4
0
7
7
1
.
 
1
1
8
0
5
1
 
u
.
1
-
U
U
.
J
t
x
:
1
\
)
1
+
=
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
,
:
)
'
-
.
N
-
c
:
:
:
H
'
l
.
.
.
.
.
 
:
:
s
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
R
e
p
u
b
 
i
c
 
o
f
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
 
-
 
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
C
u
s
t
o
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
c
i
s
et
J
j
\
J
1
-
r
-
 
.
+
:
:
\
.
.
0
\
.
)
.
J
o
e
q
"
"
'
.
 
I
 
,
 
f
.
.
.
.
r
.
1
:
8
?
R
A
D
E
 
B
E
T
W
E
E
N
 
T
H
E
 
E
E
C
 
A
N
D
 
T
H
E
 
R
E
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
O
F
 
S
O
t
J
T
H
 
A
F
R
I
C
A
 
-
 
1
9
7
6
O
.
 
F
o
o
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
1
.
 
D
r
i
n
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
b
a
c
c
o
2
.
 
R
a
w
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
,
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
n
g
 
f
u
e
l
s
3
 
e
 
E
n
e
r
g
y
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
4
.
 
F
a
t
s
5
.
 
C
h
e
m
i
c
a
l
 
n
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
.
.
.
6
.
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
d
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
7
.
 
M
a
c
h
i
n
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
r
a
n
s
o
o
r
t
.
.
.
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
8
.
 
M
i
s
c
e
l
l
a
n
e
o
u
s
 
~
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
d
g
o
o
d
s
9
.
 
M
i
s
c
e
l
l
a
n
e
o
u
s
T
O
T
A
L
 
:
T
O
T
A
L
3
0
,
4
9
2
2
0
,
2
2
5
6
3
,
9
3
2
2
5
,
1
1
7
2
,
 
q
8
7
3
2
3
,
2
8
5
4
1
7
,
4
1
7
9
5
4
,
7
0
7
.
 
1
9
1
,
6
7
 
,
 
8
5
6
3
 
,
 
0
9
6
 
,
 
9
0
2
F
R
G
3
 
I
I
 
1
8
8
3
6
8
8
6
4
5
5
1
8
2
0
1
0
8
,
4
9
6
1
4
3
,
2
3
2
7
8
5
,
2
1
"
5
1
,
4
4
3
1
1
,
2
9
6
1
1
8
.
,
4
7
0
E
E
C
 
E
X
P
O
R
'
F
r
 
a
n
c
e
3
 
#
 
7
8
9
1
 
,
 
4
4
6
3
.
.
7
4
8
4
8
0
1
3
9
2
4
 
,
4
0
5
4
5
,
7
8
3
3
3
8
.
.
 
5
5
8
2
0
,
8
2
5
1
1
1
 
3
0
6
4
4
0
,
4
7
9
t
a
l
 
y
f
I
 
Q
2
 
5
5
2
3
4
5
2
4
2
3
1
8
,
3
7
1
4
7
'
4
8
1
1
4
0
,
 
5
0
2
1
3
9
5
8
1
2
4
1
,
5
2
0
N
e
t
h
e
r
-
l
a
n
d
s
7
 
,
 
1
1
0
9
9
5
2
,
 
7
3
1
6
3
8
6
5
4
3
0
,
6
7
9
1
8
,
4
6
6
5
3
,
2
2
1
1
4
,
1
9
6
4
0
,
6
5
6
1
7
1
,
3
4
6
i
n
 
t
r
:
o
u
s
a
n
c
 
~
~
'
"
A
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
L
u
x
:
a
n
'
l
:
o
u
t
g
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
1
 
,
 
9
4
1
2
 
,
 
3
 
9
4
6
3
7
1
5
,
 
7
2
9
2
4
,
1
1
8
3
9
,
1
1
3
5
,
 
7
8
3
1
2
,
3
1
5
1
0
2
 
,
0
6
6
9
,
 
7
9
1
1
5
.
4
4
3
4
4
 
,
.
 
8
8
2
 
'
9
 
,
 
3
6
0
9
7
2
1
1
9
,
8
9
-
3
 
'
1
3
4
,
6
9
7
5
8
1
,
5
2
3
7
2
 
,
0
5
8
2
2
8
9
8
9
,
8
4
7
1
6
7
2
5
6
1
2
1
.
 
3
2
 
,
4
2
5
5
5
6
0
5
4
9
4
1
4
0
8
9
6
3
,
D
e
r
.
:
r
.
a
r
 
1
C
 
t
'
;
8
l
.
1
6
6
7
4
0
3
9
 
i
2
8
7
 
0
8
4
1
4
,
5
2
4
~
:
 
2
4
,
2
1
1T
R
A
D
B
E
~
c
E
N
 
T
H
E
 
E
E
C
 
A
N
D
 
T
H
E
 
R
E
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
O
F
 
S
O
~
7
H
 
A
F
R
I
C
A
 
-
 
1
9
7
6
i
n
 
'
J
l
i
l
l
i
c
:
1
 
E
~
J
A
E
E
C
 
I
M
P
O
R
T
T
O
T
A
L
I
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
-
B
e
1
g
i
 
u
r
n
U
n
i
 
t
e
d
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
 
F
R
G
F
r
a
n
c
e
I
t
a
l
"
.
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
t
 
l
a
n
d
s
I
;
.
:
r
x
.
e
n
i
t
a
.
1
r
c
r
.
.
.
K
 
i
 
:
:
~
~
O
'
:
'
:
\
0
.
.
F
o
o
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
4
6
6
 
,
 
9
0
8
1
3
0
,
4
5
9
3
3
,
1
7
1
2
1
,
 
7
8
9
 
2
9
,
3
7
4
3
5
,
5
3
6
1
9
7
 
,
3
5
6
7
 
,
0
3
0
1
2
,
1
9
3
1
 
D
D
r
i
n
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
b
a
c
c
o
2
3
,
5
6
7
3
0
1
1
4
,
.
 
0
1
5
9
9
9
0
3
9
1
9
5
2
.
.
R
a
w
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
n
g
f
u
e
 
1
 
6
4
2
 
3
3
2
2
3
1
p
7
4
6
'
1
0
9
,
2
2
7
8
3
 
,
 
6
1
4
2
5
,
6
8
1
2
7
,
4
2
0
1
6
0
.
,
 
5
7
6
1
,
 
1
4
1
2
 
,
 
1
2
7
~
!
1
e
r
g
y
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
1
1
3
,
2
9
8
2
0
,
5
5
9
6
2
 
,
 
8
8
2
 
1
1
'
9
1
5
8
9
8
1
3
,
9
5
6
1
-
-
 
4
8
6
6
0
2
4
.
.
F
a
t
s
2
 
,
,
9
4
9
3
4
4
1
5
1
 
2
6
3
1
 
,
 
5
4
 
7
4
5
3
1
9
1
5
,
.
C
h
e
m
i
c
a
~
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
3
8
,
 
7
8
3
7
 
,
 
3
0
1
9
 
,
 
2
8
0
 
6
 
~
 
0
5
3
2
 
,
9
8
9
4
2
7
1
1
,
2
7
1
1
5
3
3
0
9
6
.
.
M
a
n
u
 
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
d
 
g
o
o
d
s
5
 
7
 
3
 
,
 
2
 
1
9
8
,
-
9
9
2
6
2
 
,
 
3
2
3
 
1
9
 
3
5
7
1
3
7
,
8
8
6
1
1
3
,
5
1
8
2
 
,
5
1
5
1
,
 
7
0
6
3
 
6
 
,
 
9
 
0
9
 
'
7
 
y
'
 
M
a
c
h
i
n
e
s
 
a
n
d
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
7
9
"
 
e
q
u
i
p
~
~
n
t
1
5
 
8
8
1
2
 
;
 
5
9
8
,
.
.
 
-
.
.
.
1
,
 
5
9
9
9
8
1
7
 
,
 
9
4
 
7
2
9
~
l
o
,
 
1
.
 
\
~
 
:
;
,
,
:
)
8
.
.
M
i
s
c
e
l
l
a
n
e
o
u
s
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
d
g
o
o
d
 
s
1
3
,
5
0
7
5
5
6
4
7
4
3
7
5
1
,
 
7
5
9
4
5
8
7
 
,
 
1
4
 
7
 
I
6
6
3
9
"
,
H
i
 
s
 
c
e
 
1
1
 
a
n
e
o
u
s
1
 
~
 
1
4
5
 
,
 
8
8
4
 
.
2
0
4
,
8
5
8
3
3
1
/
7
7
9
4
2
8
,
9
3
1
8
6
3
3
3
4
4
7
4
,
6
7
2
3
8
8
9
8
8
,
1
7
9
T
O
T
A
L
 
0
3
6
,
3
1
5
8
0
0
,
7
1
4
2
8
7
 
,
6
7
7
6
1
6
 
1
2
1
8
8
,
1
0
6
2
2
2
 
6
4
6
1
3
.
,
 
7
'
7
9
1
 
7
 
1
/
 
0
9
 
3
.
.
,
.
'
1
j
t
A
j
+
:
-
f
i
l
l
+
:
'
\
.
.
0
\
)
.
I
"
"
-
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
 
t
e
r
n
 
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
s
 
e
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
 
o
f
n
o
n
-
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
1
/
 
u
n
w
o
r
k
e
d
 
o
r
 
s
e
m
i
-
 
f
i
n
i
s
h
e
d
 
g
o
l
d
,
 
g
o
l
d
 
s
w
e
e
p
i
n
g
s
 
o
r
 
g
o
l
d
s
m
i
 
t
h
 
'
 
w
a
s
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
g
o
l
d
 
c
o
i
n
s
.
.
.
 
:
t
-
'
-
:
:
iII  Investment
According tp certain banking information, foreign investments in
South Africa total  121 000  million us dollars. Although ~it is difficult
to be sure of their precise origin, it would seem that Europe accounts
for 74% and America (North and South) 18% of these investments.
Loans to the central government and loans and invest~ent in the
banking sector are estimated at 1, 400 million US dollars, more than half
of which comes from the EEC  Within the private sector (including cert~in
quasi-pUblic undertakings and local authorities) , foreig~ investment 
mainly concentrated in 4 areas:
Ma. :1facture $4, 100 million
' nance $2, 600 million
Mi foLi ng $1, 500 million
Comoerce and the $1, 180 million
hotel trade
Investment in the manufacturing sector almost always involves effective
control of management, whereas in the mining industry the general rule 
portfolio inv~ettl\ent. In the latter sector private foreign invesbment,
chiefly in the form of shares, accounts for more than 60% of total foreign
investment.
- 56 - PE 54.493/ANN.VI/fin.OPINION OF THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
Letter from the cornmi ttee chairman to MrS
commi ttee . on Development and Cooperation
Colette FLESCH, chairman of the
3 January 1979
Dear Mrs Flesch,
At its mee~ing of 19 December 1978 the Political Affairs committee
discussed the application of the code of conduct for companies with sub-
sidiaries, bran~hes or representations in South Africa, on which it is required
to de liver an opinion for your committee.
It approved the following points which I wish to draw to your
attention.
The Political Affairs Comrni ttee welcomes the fact that on 
September 1977 the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation
approved a code of conduct for Communi ty companies in South Africa,
particularly insofar as this affects the working conditions of coloured
employees of Co~munity subsidiaries in South Africa.
It considers these measures to be useful in that they are designed
to persuade the South African Government to abandon its policy of racial
segregation of coloured ci tizens and to ensure that their human rights are
Iso recogni zed and respected.
However  the Poli tical Affairs Comrni ttee is aware that the code of
conduct is not ~lholly or uniformly applied by the companies concerned and
it considers therefore that I as a priqri ty, the Governments of the
Communi ty Member states should use the powers available to them to ensure
strict observance of the coae.
It considers that, through the President-in-Office, the Foreign
Ministers meeting in political cooperation should report annually to the
European parliament on the observance and application of the code so that
Parliament will be in a better situation to assess the precise situation.
It also hopes that in future the Commission will be given the task
of synthesizing and evaluating the reports from the Community companies
concerning the code of conduct.
Present: Mr Bertrand, chairman; Mr Radoux, Mr Brugha, vice-chairmen; Mr Adams
(deputizing for Mr Patijn), Mr Eberhard (deputizing for Mr Ansart), Mr Fletcher-
Cooke, Mr Granelli, Mr Mitchell, Mr Santer (deputizing for Mr Blumenfeld)
Mr Scott-Hopkins (deputizing for Lord Reay), Mr Seefeld and Mr Sieglersch~idt.
- 57 PE 54. 493/fin..Lastly., th~ Political Affairs Committee is of the opinion that, in
pursuing a coherent policy on South Africa, the Community and the Governments
of its Member States should not reject the most appropriate means of
exerting pressure on the Government of that country to abandon its policy
of racial segregation and adopt practical measures aimed at ensuring that
the coloured majori ty in South Africa is granted full human rights; the
committee intends to take a very strong line .on this issue in its report
on the political situation in South Africa.
Yours fai thfully,
(sgd) Alfred BERTRAND
- 58 - PE 56. 493/fin.